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A B S T R A C T. In the decade following Seminole Tribe's ruling that Article I is not a grant of
authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity, scholars and courts overwhelmingly agreed that
the Eleventh Amendment barred Congress from subjecting states to suit in bankruptcy
proceedings. The Court has since backpedaled, holding in Katz that the states ceded their
sovereign immunity when they ratified the Bankruptcy Clause. Katz, however, leaves much
unsettled -including whether the ratifying states intended to cede their immunity defenses to
suits seeking monetary damages. There is also reason to doubt Katz's durability: beyond the
serious flaws in its reasoning, Eleventh Amendment precedents perish and reanimate with the
changing composition of the Court, and mere days after Katz was handed down, Justice
O'Connor, who provided the fifth vote for the majority, was replaced by Justice Alito. The
prospect that Katz may be overruled or cabined has caused anxiety for scholars and practioners
who convincingly argue that the bankruptcy system cannot effectively function unless the states,
like private creditors, are subject to the binding jurisdiction of bankruptcy tribunals.
In an effort to insure against Katz's rollback, this Note offers a new theory for how
Congress could invoke its enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
authorize suits against the state for bankruptcy violations. Borrowing from the case law on
statutory entitlements and procedural due process, the Note argues that like welfare, public
education, and government employment, bankruptcy protections are property interests
cognizable under the Due Process Clause. Because these property interests are conferred by the
federal government and binding on the states, a state that tramples on an individual's
bankruptcy rights in violation of federal law effects an unconstitutional deprivation of property
without due process.
A U T H O R. Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2010; Harvard University, A.B. 2006. Special
thanks to Anand Balakrishnan, Eric Brunstad, Nicholas Parrillo, Judith Resnik, and Elizabeth
Tulis for their insightful comments.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the scope of Congress's authority to abrogate state
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings has ebbed and flowed as
factions within the Court have battled over the proper meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment. Following the Court's watershed ruling in Seminole Tribe v.
Florida' that Congress could not subject states to suit under the Indian
Commerce Clause,2 and the majority and dissent's dicta that the ruling applied
to all Article I grants,3 courts and commentators overwhelmingly concluded
that states enjoyed immunity from private proceedings brought under the
Bankruptcy Code.4 A cry of alarm issued from bankruptcy scholars and some
judges, who convincingly argued that exempting states-among the largest
and most frequent creditors in bankruptcy-from the binding jurisdiction of
bankruptcy courts would inflict significant damage on the regime's ability to
function effectively.'
1. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
2. The majority dismissed the dissent's claim that the decision would deprive individuals of
any remedy for state violations of federal law, but it did not confute its characterization of
the case as applying to the totality of Article I. Id. at 72 n.16.
3. Congress's bankruptcy powers are housed in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
4. See, e.g., Nelson v. La Crosse County Dist. Att'y, 301 F.3d 820, 838 (7th Cir. 2002); Mitchell
v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 209 F.3d 1111, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2000); NVR Homes,
Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts (In re NVR), 189 F.3d 442, 454 (4 th Cir. 1999); Sacred
Heart Hosp. of Norristown v. Pennsylvania (In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown), 133
F.3d 237, 241-45 (3d Cir. 1998); Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths of
Wash., D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147-49 (4 th Cir. 1997); see also S. Elizabeth Gibson,
Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy: The Next Chapter, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 201-03 (1996)
(arguing that after Seminole Tribe, states could not be sued in bankruptcy court without
their consent). But see Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 820-23 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to determine discharge of state debt).
S. See, e.g., Laura B. Bartell, Getting to Waiver-A Legislative Solution to State Sovereign Immunity
in Bankruptcy After Seminole Tribe, 17 BANKR. DEv. J. 17, 17 (2000); Ralph Brubaker, From
Fictionalism to Functionalism in State Sovereign Immunity: The Bankruptcy Discharge as
Statutory Ex parte Young ReliefAfter Hood, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 59, 68-69 (2005)
[hereinafter Brubaker, From Fictionalism]; Ralph Brubaker, Of State Sovereign Immunity and
Prospective Remedies: The Bankruptcy Discharge as Statutory Ex Parte Young Relief, 76 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 461 (2002); Leonard H. Gerson, A Bankruptcy Exception to Eleventh Amendment
Immunity: Limiting the Seminole Tribe Doctrine, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2000); The
Honorable Randolph J. Haines, Getting to Abrogation, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 447, 468-70 (2001)
(documenting state infringements on bankruptcy rights post-Seminole Tribe); Katrina A.
Kelly, In the Aftermath of Seminole: Waiver of Soveriegn [sic) Immunity Under Section io6(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code, 15 BANKR. DEv. J. 151, 182-83 (1999); Ned W. Waxman & David C.
Christian II, Federal Powers after Seminole Tribe: Constitutionally Bankrupt, 47 DRAKE L. REV.
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Eight years later, the Court began to backtrack. In Tennessee Student
Assistance Corp. v. Hood, it declared that discharge actions, because they are in
6rem and not suits against the state, did not violate the Eleventh Amendment.
Two years later, in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, the Court
declared that in personam actions to reclaim preferential transfers -concededly
suits against the state-were permissible because they were "ancillary" to and
necessary to facilitate the in rem functioning of bankruptcy courts! The five-
person Katz majority carved out a bankruptcy-wide exception to Seminole Tribe
by finding that when the states ratified the Bankruptcy Clause, they intended
to cede their claims to sovereign immunity in suits brought to enforce
bankruptcy laws. As written, the decision did not purport to alter Seminole
Tribe's holding that Congress cannot subject states to suit under Article I
without their consent.8 Instead of attacking that principle directly, it grafted
consent onto the Bankruptcy Clause itself.
However, it is unlikely that the last word has been spoken on the matter.
While the Katz majority disclaimed Seminole Tribe's dicta that Congress cannot
abrogate state immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause, 9 there are several
reasons to suspect that the Court will revisit the issue and revise its recent
judgments. First, decisions delineating the Eleventh Amendment have
unusually unpredictable lifespans, perishing" (and sometimes reanimating)
with the changing composition of the Court. Neither of the Court's factions
has been shy about casting stare decisis aside when reviewing decisions
pertaining to the scope of state sovereign immunity." The fierceness and
467, 483-84 (1998). But see O'Brien v. Vermont (In re O'Brien), 216 B.R. 731, 736 (Bankr. D.
Vt. 1998) (dismissing such criticism as cries of alarm by "Chicken Littles").
6. 541 U.S. 440, 443, 453 (2004).
7. 546 U.S. 356, 373 (2006).
8. 517 U.S. 44,47 (1996).
9. 546 U.S. at 363.
1o. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled by
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 63-73; Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S.
184 (1964), overruled by Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999).
ii. The liberal wing has explicitly and consistently signaled its desire to overrule Seminole Tribe.
See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97-98 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Despite my respect for stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept Seminole Tribe as controlling
precedent. . . . [T]he reasoning of that opinion is so profoundly mistaken and so
fundamentally inconsistent with the Framers' conception of the constitutional order that it
has forsaken any claim to the usual deference and respect owed to decisions of this Court.");
Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (declaring that he is "not yet ready to
adhere to the proposition of law set forth in Seminole Tribe"). The conservative wing has
been equally willing to uproot precedent articulating a generous view of Congress's power
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persistence of the factions' disagreement has occasioned scholarly resort to
military analogies: one scholar speaks of "tit-for-tat retaliation,"' 2 another of
"doctrinal guerilla warfare." 3 Importandy, the composition of the Court has
undergone a significant change since Katz: one week after Justice O'Connor
furnished the fifth vote in that decision, Justice Alito was sworn in as her
to override state immunity. See, e.g., Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 68o (overruling Parden, 377
U.S. 184 (1964)); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 63-73 (overruling Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989) (plurality opinion)); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 127
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court repudiates at least 28 cases, spanning well
over a century of this Court's jurisprudence.. . ."); id. at 132-37 (describing these cases). For
an analysis of the internal dispute in the Court over sovereign immunity and the Court's
willingness to disregard precedent, see Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 52 & n.205 (1988); and Neil S.
Siegel, State Sovereign Immunity and Stare Decisis: Solving the Prisoners' Dilemma Within the
Court, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1165 (2ooi).
12. Andrew B. Coan, Text as Truce: A Peace Proposal for the Supreme Court's Costly War over the
Eleventh Amendment, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511, 2520 (2006).
13. Martin H. Redish & Daniel M. Greenfield, Bankruptcy, Sovereign Immunity and the Dilemma
of Principled Decision Making: The Curious Case of Central Virginia Community College v.
Katz, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 13, 19 (2007). Academic treatment of the Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence has been overwhelmingly negative. Among the common
criticisms of this body of law is that it is confusing, unprincipled, subversive to the
supremacy of federal law, and contrary to the notion that for every right against the
government there should be a corresponding remedy. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987) (arguing that expansive readings of state
sovereign immunity undermine the constitutional guarantee to redress for government
wrongs); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment was
intended to eliminate diversity jurisdiction, not jurisdiction based on federal claims); John J.
Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1891 (1983) (arguing that the Court has strayed from the Framers'
understanding of state sovereign immunity and that the "eleventh amendment [sic] today
represents little more than a hodgepodge of confusing and intellectually indefensible judge-
made law"); Jackson, supra note 11, at 72-104 (arguing that state sovereign immunity is a
common law principle that Congress may overrule); John F. Manning, The Eleventh
Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1670 (2004)
(criticizing the Court for giving an expansive meaning to the "precise rule-like terms" of the
Eleventh Amendment); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v.
Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History and "Federal Courts," 81 N.C. L. REv. 1927 (2003)
(arguing that Court's decision in Hans v. Lousiana extending the Eleventh Amendment to
suits brought by citizens against their own state was part of a post-Reconstruction
settlement to reestablish "white rule" in the South).
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replacement. This has led at least two scholars to question Katz's durability 4
and another to predict its demise."
Second, the problematic reasoning on display in Hood and Katz leaves these
decisions vulnerable to pruning or repeal. 6 Unable to attack Seminole Tribe's
holding head-on, the Katz majority argued that bankruptcy was unique among
Article I grants of authority. But in disaggregating the bankruptcy power from
the rest of Article I, the majority relied on a questionable characterization of
bankruptcy proceedings as in rem and, therefore, inoffensive to state
immunity. It padded a gossamer thin historical record with speculation to
assert that the states "understood" they were ceding their immunity in all suits
"on the subject of Bankruptcies" - in rem and in personam alike-when they
ratified the Bankruptcy Clause.17 Thus, even scholars and practitioners who
applauded the ultimate conclusion found fault with how the Court arrived at
its decision."
Third, the Supreme Court will likely have to revisit Katz to clarify its scope.
The majority did not define the limits of its "ancillary order" theory. 9 The
majority provided that "insofar as orders ancillary to the bankruptcy courts' in
rem jurisdiction.., implicate States' sovereign immunity from suit, the States
agreed in the plan of the Convention not to assert that immunity" ;2O but it also
warned that its decision was "not meant to suggest that every law labeled a
14. Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik, Sovereignties-Federal, State, and Tribal: The Story of
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES, 329, 356 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith
Resnik eds., 2010).
is. See Rochelle Bobroff, The Early Roberts Court Attacks Congress's Power to Protect Civil Rights,
30 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 231, 260 (20o8).
16. For a trenchant criticism of Hood, see The Honorable Randolph J. Haines, The Uniformity
Power: Why Bankruptcy is Different, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 129 (2003) [hereinafter, Haines,
Uniformity].
17. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 372, 370 (2006).
18. See Ralph Brubaker, Explaining Katzs New Bankruptcy Exception to State Sovereign Immunity:
The Bankruptcy Power as a Federal Forum Power, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 95, 97 (2007)
[hereinafter Brubaker, Explaining Katz]; Brubaker, From Fictionalism, supra note 5, at 74-80;
Thomas E. Plank, State Sovereignty in Bankruptcy After Katz, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 59,
60 (2007); Redish & Greenfield, supra note 13, at 48. As one scholar aptly put it, "In Katz,
the Court created a bad exception to a bad rule. It used speculative history to counter
speculative history, unprincipled reasoning to counter unprincipled reasoning, silence to
counter silence." Scott Fruehwald, The Supreme Court's Confusing State Sovereign Immunity
Jurisprudence, S6 DRAKE L. REv. 253, 298 (2008).
ig. Richard Lieb, State Sovereign Immunity: Bankruptcy is Special, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv.
201, 232 (2006) (arguing that the "ancillary" includes all proceedings "related to"
bankruptcy).
20. Katz, 546 U.S. at 373.
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'bankruptcy' law could, consistent with the Bankruptcy Clause, properly
impinge upon state sovereign immunity."21 That formulation cum caveat
prompts a new set of questions. What are the dimensions of an ancillary order?
To which bankruptcy laws does the ancillary order theory apply? Insofar as the
majority purported to ground its conclusion in the Framers' comprehension of
contemporary bankruptcy law, how should the courts adapt that intent to
modern innovations in the Bankruptcy Code? As the courts take up these
nagging questions, opportunities will abound to roll back Katz.
Perhaps the most unsettled issue is whether states intended to submit
themselves to suit for retroactive money damages. In Edelman v. Jordan,2" the
Court etched a distinction into Eleventh Amendment doctrine between Exparte
Young suits for prospective relief, which it permitted, and actions for
retrospective monetary relief, which it did not. Conservatives on the Court
have defended this remedial distinction on the grounds that it strikes an
appropriate balance between the need to maintain the primacy of federal law
and the preservation of state immunity.23 In Green v. Mansour, a five-Justice
majority went a step further and declared that remedies designed only to serve
"compensatory or deterrence interests" were impermissible under the Eleventh
Amendment. ' Much rides on whether the Court applies that remedial
distinction in the bankruptcy context. As explained below, bankruptcy
violations may inflict severe economic harm on already financially distressed
parties, but in most cases the violation is complete before the party can
commence an action for relief. In an effort to ensure adequate compensation
and deter misconduct, the Code provides for compensatory damages, punitive
damages, and attorneys' fees for willful bankruptcy violations.2" But this
21. Id. at 378 n.15.
22. 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
23. Penrhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105-o6 (1984). For an interesting
discussion of the prospective-retrospective remedial distinction, see Carlos Manuel
Vizquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-
Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1 (1998).
24. 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006) ("[A]n individual injured by any willful violation of a stay
provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees,
and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages."). One lower court has
found that Katz does permit such suits. See Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Omine (In re Omine),
485 F.3d 1305 (lith Cir. 2007). But there is a strong argument that it is prohibited under
Edelman, in which the Supreme Court held that "[a] suit by private parties seeking to
impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment." 415 U.S. at 663.
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provision's constitutionality as applied to states is an open question even after
Katz.
Finally, the recent economic crisis may hasten reconsideration. The number
of bankruptcy filings has skyrocketed in the past two years,26 any one of which
might occasion the act of state noncompliance that furnishes the test case to
roll back Katz. Perhaps more importantly from a realist vantage point, the
economic turbulence responsible for the surge in bankruptcy filings has also
occasioned state budgetary crises across the country.27 Against this backdrop,
the argument that the Eleventh Amendment is a necessary bar to private suits
that "threaten the financial integrity of the States"2i may resonate more with
swing Justices who are asked to endorse a rule that would subject financially
stressed states to further liability.
To shore up Katz's holding-and ensure its extension to retroactive
damages actions-this Note advances a new theory as to how Congress can
abrogate state sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings. This Note
proposes that Congress re-enact § io6(a) 29- the Bankruptcy Code's immunity-
stripping provision- under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the
factions within the Court continue to contest whether Article I can ever be a
valid source of authority to subject states to suit, both sides agree-and
Seminole Tribe explicitly affirmed -that Congress may abrogate state immunity
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the substantive
guarantees of Sections 1 through 4 .3" Thus, in the aftermath of Seminole Tribe,
Congress began to rejustify immunity stripping provisions originally enacted
under Article I as valid exercises of its Section 5 powers. While the Court has
thwarted many of these efforts in a constellation of decisions that has reworked
several key areas of constitutional doctrine, 31 this Note argues that abrogating
state immunity in bankruptcy under Section 5 remains a viable option.
z6. Bankruptcy filings have increased steadily since 2006, and increased by thirty-four percent
in fiscal year 2009. News Release, Bankruptcy Filings Up 34 Percent over Last
Fiscal Year (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/2oo9/
BankruptcyFilingsSep2009.cfm [hereinafter News Release, Bankruptcy Filings Up].
27. Jobless Rate Went Higher in 26 States Last Month, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 22, 20o9, at B6.
28. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999).
29. 11 U.S.C. § io6(a).
3o. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (affirming the Court's holding in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), that Congress can extinguish state sovereignty
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
31. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (invalidating a
provision of the American Disabilities Act authorizing suit against states for disability
discrimination); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (invalidating a provision
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act authorizing suit against states for age
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Many scholars and judges have been quick to dismiss this option, casting
the Court's decision in United States v. Kras that individuals lack substantive
due process rights in bankruptcy as the gravaman of any attempt to frame state
defiance of federal bankruptcy law as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. I contend, however, that by resorting to a different doctrine -the
doctrine of "statutory entitlements" and procedural due process -it is in fact
possible to bring federally conferred bankruptcy rights within the ambit of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The key substantive guarantee for the purposes of
this analysis is the Due Process Clause, which provides that the state may not
"deprive any person of. . . property, without due process of law." 2 City of
Boerne v. Flores33 held that Congress's powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment are remedial, not definitional -that is, Congress can remedy
ongoing violations of constitutional rights but it cannot declare the substance
of those rights. There is, however, an important asterisk to that proposition.
Determining how much process must accompany state deprivations of property
interests is the prerogative of the Court. But determining whether a
constitutionally cognizable property interest exists in the first place is primarily
(albeit no longer exclusively) the function of the legislature. 4 Until recently,
the Court would recognize a protected property interest in any monetizable
benefit grounded in positive law, so long as that law constrained officialdom's
discretion in dispensing and terminating the benefit."5 The Court dubbed these
"statutory entitlements," a category encompassing, among other things,
welfare, government employment, unadjudicated causes of action, public
education, and licenses. 36
This Note adds bankruptcy protections to that list. Such protections
display all the attributes of statutory entitlements: they have readily
ascertainable monetary values, and they are grounded in the Federal
discrimination); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666 (1999) (invalidating a law authorizing suit against states for false advertising); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
(invalidating a law authorizing suit against a state for patent infringements).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
34. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) ("The right to due process
'is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature
may elect not to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without
appropriate procedural safeguards.'" (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in part))).
35. See infra Section IV.
36. See infra notes 201-206.
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Bankruptcy Code. Most importandy, insofar as the Code binds the states by
virtue of the Supremacy Clause,37 federal bankruptcy regulations act as an
absolute constraint on state discretion to deprive individuals of federally
conferred bankruptcy rights. It is at this juncture that Congress's legislative
powers under Article I and its abrogation powers under Section 5 converge.
Even the Katz dissenters implicitly concede that, though Seminole Tribe may
have eliminated Article I as a source of authority to subject states to private suit
in bankruptcy, Seminole Tribe did nothing to alter Congress's unquestioned
authority under Article I to impose substantive obligations on the states in the
field of bankruptcy. 8 The Court's most fervid defenders of state sovereign
immunity would readily acknowledge that a state that defies the mandates of
the Bankruptcy Code acts in violation of federal law,39 and, in fact, the Seminole
Tribe majority proffered a list of legal tools that both private citizens and the
federal government might use to enforce federal law in the face of state
noncompliance. 4 0
In short, the import of the Eleventh Amendment is that it purges a
particular enforcement technique -private suits against unconsenting states-
from that list; it does not alter the unlawfulness of the state's noncompliance.
Seminole Tribe implicitly erects a distinction between state action that is
unlawful (state defiance of federal commands) and state action that is
unconstitutional (state deprivation of property without due process). Seminole
Tribe extinguishes Congress's authority to authorize private suits against the
state to counter the former, but upholds that authority to counter the latter.
37. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
38. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 384 (2oo6) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the states' authority to legislate in the field is a facet of sovereignty independent of their
capacity to avoid being hauled into court by private parties).
39. Indeed, decisions extending Seminole Tribe have consistently flagged the distinction between
Congress's unquestioned ability to impose obligations on the states via Article I and its
authority to enforce those obligations by authorizing private suit. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("It must be
noted, moreover, that what is in question is not whether the Congress, acting pursuant to a
power granted to it by the Constitution, can compel the States to act. What is involved is
only the question whether the States can be subjected to liability in suits brought not by the
Federal Government... but by private persons seeking to collect moneys from the state
treasury without the consent of the State."); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732-33 (1999)
(holding that Congress's authority to pass laws binding on the states does not give rise to an
incidental authority to subject states to private suit); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 72 (1996) ("Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking
authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.").
40. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 n.16.
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And here is the key point: the Supremacy Clause, by eliminating states'
discretion to defy federal bankruptcy law, satisfies the final condition of a
statutory entitlement. It effectively elevates bankruptcy rights to the status of
protected property. Therefore, when a state trenches on those rights without
due process, it not only acts unlawfully-it acts unconstitutionally. Having
established the predicate constitutional violation, Congress should be able to
invoke its remedial powers under Section 5 to subject states to suit.
41
Two companion cases, College Savings Bank and Florida Prepaid, have
concededly muddied the doctrinal waters. In College Savings Bank, the Court
invalidated a law subjecting states to suit for false and misleading advertising
on the grounds that the interests the law protected did not qualify as property.
Writing for five members of the Court, Justice Scalia held that an essential
attribute of protected property is the "right to exclude."42 The majority did not
explain how this squares with the previous definition of property as a statutory
entitlement and the Court's recognition of nonexclusionary rights like
unadjudicated causes of action43 and education. 44 In Florida Prepaid, the same
majority held that Congress could not subject states to suit for infringements
on federally conferred property rights if the states offered their own remedy.
4
These cases may prefigure greater judicial involvement in defining the
dimensions of protected property as well as a high degree of suspicion toward
congressional attempts to sidestep Seminole Tribe by grounding Article I
enactments in the Fourteenth Amendment. They suggest that Congress may
not simply impose a duty on the states, denominate it property, and enforce
the right by subjecting states to suit. But, as I will show, these cases do not
undermine the serviceability of entitlement theory as a basis for abrogating
state immunity in bankruptcy proceedings.
The statutory entitlement/due process approach presents numerous
advantages. It does not rely on a quixotic search for a fundamental right to
bankruptcy protections in the Constitution itself. It recognizes that most
bankruptcy rights are bequeathed by Congress and may be retracted without
constitutional objection. 46 It provides a substitute rationale for upholding
41. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
42. 527 U.S. at 672.
43. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
44. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
45. 527 U.S. at 643.
46. Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in result in part) (explaining that the legislature may elect not to confer a
property interests in the first place).
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abrogation should a later Court reject the reasoning in Katz. It also guarantees
that individuals will be able to wrest money damages from states for flouting
bankruptcy regulations, for it is well settled that Congress may open the states'
purses to private suits for infringements of Fourteenth Amendment rights.47
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I explains why permitting states to
assert sovereign immunity to evade the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts
undermines the proper functioning of the bankruptcy regime. Part II
summarizes the recent Court rulings in Hood and Katz that have narrowed state
sovereign immunity defenses in bankruptcy proceedings. Part III offers a
critique of Hood and Katz and explains why the bankruptcy-wide exception to
Seminole Tribe is vulnerable to rollback by the present Court. Part IV explains
how bankruptcy protections qualify as property cognizable under the Due
Process Clause and how states use their immunity as a shield to
unconstitutionally deprive individuals of those property rights. It will then
explain how Congress may use Section 5 to enforce those rights against state
infringements. Finally, Part V will explain the broader implications of
entitlement theory, as well as its limitations, as a vehicle to bypass the Court's
holding in Seminole Tribe.
I. THE DESTRUCTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
DEFENSES IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
In Seminole Tribe, a five member majority ruled that Congress could not
authorize suits against states in federal court to enforce legislative enactments
passed under the Commerce Clause of Article 1.48 In Alden v. Maine, the same
majority extended that principle to immunize states from private suits arising
under federal claims in state courts.49 While neither decision pertained to
bankruptcy, the majority and dissent in Seminole Tribe pronounced that the
ruling applied to the full run of Article I grants, bankruptcy included."s
Indeed, the conclusion that no Article I power was spared Seminole Tribe's
judgment seemed to follow inexorably from the broad suppositions about state
sovereign immunity on which the majority relied. The majority's approach
disaggregated state sovereignty into two independent facets -immunity from
47. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. 445.
48. In so doing, the majority overruled its decision seven years prior in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), that the Commerce Clause was a valid source of authority to
abrogate state immunity. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996).
49. 527 U.S. 7o6 (1999).
50. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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private suit and freedom from federal regulation -and implied that the validity
of the congressional regulation had no bearing on whether Congress could
enforce it by subjecting states to suit."1 Further, the majority's approach refused
to credit arguments about the pragmatics of enforcement; even a showing that
abrogating immunity was critical to enforcing a particular regulatory regime
would not conjure Article I authority to do so. Rather, the only source of
authority to displace state sovereignty after Seminole Tribe was the Fourteenth
Amendment, and because few believed bankruptcy implicated its provisions, it
appeared that states retained immunity in suits brought in state and federal
courts to enforce compliance with validly enacted federal bankruptcy laws.
Many scholars criticized this result, expressing anxiety that preserving state
immunity defenses in bankruptcy would undermine the regime's integrity."2
States are not mere spectators in the bankruptcy process-in a majority of cases
they are implicated as creditors filing tax claims, environmental creditors,
equity interest holders, bond and leaseholders, parties to discharge disputes, or
as defendants from whom trustees and debtors seek recovery. As this Part
elaborates, permitting states to assert their sovereign immunity in bankruptcy
proceedings threatens to undermine the three core principles underpinning the
bankruptcy regime: ensuring equitable distribution among creditors, 3
rehabilitating viable businesses, 4 and affording the "honest but unfortunate
debtor" a fresh start.
55
A. Equality ofDistribution Among Creditors
The primary purpose of the bankruptcy regime is to provide a collective
system that maximizes return for the body of creditors by distributing the
debtor's assets pro rata according to a set system of priorities. s6 The problem
that the bankruptcy cures is thus: when a debtor becomes insolvent, there are a
multitude of creditors clamoring to collect from a pile of assets that is, by
definition, too small to accommodate all claims. Knowing this, creditors have
51. 517 U.S. at 72.
52. See, e.g., Bartell, supra note 5; Haines, supra note 5; Kenneth N. Klee, James 0. Johnston &
Eric Winston, State Defiance of Bankruptcy Law, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1527, 1579-84 (1999).
53. SeeYoung v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945).
54. JEFF FERRIELL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY § 1.oi, at 5-6 (2d ed.
2007).
55. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) ("The principal purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code is to grant a 'fresh start' to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor.'" (quoting
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286, 287 (1991))).
56. See THOMAs H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITs OF BANKRuPrcy LAW 7-19 (1986).
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every incentive to collect as much as possible as fast as possible, without any
regard for the fact that maximizing their recovery comes at the expense of other
creditors. For example, imagine a debtor owed $1o,ooo to each of ten
unsecured creditors for a total of $10o,ooo in debts, but she only has $1o,ooo
total in assets. Without some externally imposed system of debt collection, the
first creditor to file suit and get a judgment collects all $1o,ooo- the remaining
nine creditors are left empty handed. But if all parties could agree to file their
claims simultaneously, each would get a guaranteed return of $i,ooo. This
hypothetical agreement is often called the "creditors' bargain."' The
bankruptcy regime solves the collective action problem by imposing the
creditors' bargain: the moment a party files for bankruptcy, an automatic stay
issues that prevents all collection efforts . 8 To counteract creditors' incentives
to beat the bankruptcy filing and collect at the first signs of insolvency, the
Code provides that all pre-petition payments within ninety days of filing will
be returned to the estate.s9 The assets are then collected into a single estate so
they may be distributed on an equitable basis.
6,
This system cannot function if one creditor, especially one as large and
frequent as the state, can opt out by asserting immunity. If states were
unbound by the Code, a state could initiate collection proceedings and deplete
the debtor's estate before the other creditors had time to file their proofs of
claim, and the courts would be unable to afford either debtor or creditor relief.
The Seventh Circuit explained the dire consequences resulting from the
creditors' race to collect claims:
If the federal courts were not able to order a state to turn over assets to
a bankruptcy estate, then any state owed money by a debtor having
financial problems would have a strong incentive to collect whatever
funds it believed to be due as rapidly as possible-even if this pushed
the debtor into insolvency- rather than risking the possibility of
recovering only a portion of their debt in any subsequent bankruptcy
proceedings. In effect, we would be holding that the Constitution
makes a state a preferred creditor in every bankruptcy. The very
existence of this power would doubtless encourage other creditors to
57. FERIELL & EDWARD,supra note 54, § i.o2, at lo.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
59. Id. 547.
60. Id. 541(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) ("The district court in which a case under title 11 is
commenced or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . .of all of the property,
wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the
estate. ...").
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accelerate their collections. The end result would be an increase in
bankruptcies and a distortion of the system of preferences that
Congress has carefully crafted.61
In short, allowing the state to assert its immunity would turn it into a
super-creditor, unraveling the equitable guarantees of the bankruptcy regime.
B. Rehabilitating Viable Businesses
A second purpose of the bankruptcy system is to give distressed but viable
businesses an opportunity to regain solvency. The central purpose of Chapter
11 bankruptcy is to preserve going-concern value, save jobs, and promote the
efficient use of capital. 62 If the going-concern value is greater than the
liquidation value of its assets, Chapter 11 reorganization will enable debtors to
pay a higher percentage of their prepetition debts than Chapter 7 liquidation .63
However, a permissive bankruptcy regime that allowed selected creditors to
nibble away at the estate could cripple potentially profitable businesses and
force debtors into inefficient and unnecessary liquidations. Thus, the
bankruptcy system offers two safeguards. First, the Code provides that if a
creditor seizes property prior to the debtor's bankruptcy filing, the creditor
must return the property to the estate.6" The reason is simple: property
seizures, even if they do not immediately force the business to shutter, may
hamper the business's ability to generate income, worsen its financial standing,
and eventually force liquidation. To take a stylized example, a successfully
reorganizing publishing company could be well on its way out of insolvency,
but if a state creditor lost patience and exercised its lien on the printing press,
business would come to a halt, and the other creditors would watch their
investments vanish. If a state were to seize a debtor's assets prior to the
bankruptcy filing and assert its immunity, neither the debtor nor the creditors
would have recourse in federal court. Even if the state waived its common law
61. McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Sec'y of State (In re McVey Trucking, Inc.), 812 F.2d 311, 328 (7th
Cir. 1987).
62. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) ("By permitting
reorganization, Congress anticipated that the business would continue to provide jobs, to
satisfy creditors' claims, and to produce a return for its owners. Congress presumed that the
assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated business than if 'sold
for scrap.'" (internal citations omitted)).
63. Of course, this simplistic formulation is more often true in theory than in reality. The vast
majority of firms never manage to successfully reorganize. WIIAM D. WARREN & DANIEL J.
BUSSEL, BANKRUPTCY 593 (6th ed. 2002).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a).
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immunity in its own courts and the private parties sought a remedy in state
court, the delays and expense of pursuing parallel suits in two courts could
severely hamper the viability of reorganization.6 s
Second, the Code provides for a temporary injunction against
debt-collection efforts at the moment of filing, called the automatic stay. The
automatic stay has been referred to as "an essential foundation block of the
bankruptcy rebuilding process" for good reason.66 The moment the debtor
files a bankruptcy petition, all civil actions involving the debtor, her property,
and the property of the estate are brought to a halt. This provides debtors with
a "breathing spell" from creditor pressure and harassment to collect their
claims.6' For an individual, this might stop an imminent mortgage foreclosure
sale or prevent a wage garnishment.68 The automatic stay is especially critical
for Chapter 11 reorganization cases, in which the creditors' interest in prompt
collection of the maximum amount of the debt collides with the debtor's need
to maintain control over the estate in order to prepare and follow a
reorganization plan.
One case in particular illustrates how state violations of the automatic stay
may endanger the viability of a profitable business. In In re Tri-City Turf-Club,
a horse racing club in Kentucky filed a voluntary petition for reorganization
under Chapter 11. 6 ' The State Racing Commission responded by revoking
Tri-City's license to host live horse racing, in violation of the automatic stay.7"
The debtor initiated adversary proceedings against the Commission and won
an injunction against the state from revoking its license.7 But shortly
thereafter, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Seminole Tribe and the
bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding, holding that "Seminole
Tribe clearly undermines the jurisdictional basis of this action against the
65. See Paul's Lobster Co. v. Massachusetts (In re Paul's Lobster Co.), 206 B.R. 275, 276-77
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1997); Meehan v. Pennsylvania (In re Barsky), 6 B.R. 624, 627 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 198o) (observing that state retention of the debtor's property seized prepetition
would lead Chapter 11 cases to forced liquidation); see also Gerson, supra note 5, at 8 (" [If
the creditor making the seizure is a state claiming sovereign immunity, the debtor ... may
be forced to utilize lengthy state court remedies, making a reorganization much less
likely.").
66. Patterson v. B.F. Goodrich Employees Fed. Credit Union (In re Patterson), 125 B. 40, 47
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 199o).
67. Tringali v. Hathaway Mach. Co., 796 F.2d 553, 562 (lst Cir. 1986).
68. FERRIELL &JANGER, supra note 54, § 8.ol, at 257.
69. In re Tri-City Turf Club, Inc., 203 B.R. 617 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996).
70. Id. at 618.
71. Id.
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defendant, Kentucky Racing Commission, and the members of the
Commission. This court simply lacks jurisdiction to entertain this adversary
proceeding.71
C. The "Fresh Start"Principle
A third core principle of American bankruptcy law is that the honest but
unfortunate debtor should be given a financial "fresh start," liberated from the
crippling debt that drove the debtor into insolvency.73 The primary mechanism
by which bankruptcy law affords a fresh start is the discharge. The debtor files
a petition for bankruptcy, which triggers the automatic stay and halts collection
efforts. Following the petition, the debtor submits a plan for the handling of
certain outstanding debts, and upon completion, the automatic stay matures
into the discharge-that is, the debtor is permanently relieved of personal
liability for repayment of pre-petition debts and the individual (or corporate
entity) becomes entitled to retain post-petition earnings.74 If, however,
creditors -either state or private -could insist on collecting discharged debts,
individuals and corporations could be strangled by debt in perpetuity.
Exempting states from the court's jurisdiction interferes with the debtor's
ability to secure the relief promised by the Bankruptcy Code in several ways.
The most egregious cases are those in which the state disregards a court order
shielding debtors from collection efforts. Thus, in In re Martinez, a court
approved a Chapter 13 reorganization plan that listed tax debts to Puerto Rico's
Department of Treasury.7s The Department of Treasury never filed a proof of
claim, and the debtors spent the next three years handling their finances in
accordance with the reorganization plan, until the Department of Treasury
suddenly filed a tax lien on the debtors' property for $100,000.76 The debtors
72. Id. at 620.
73. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904) ("Systems of bankruptcy are designed to relieve
the honest debtor from the weight of indebtedness which has become oppressive and to
permit him to have a fresh start in business or commercial life, freed from the obligation and
responsibilities which may have resulted from business misfortunes."). For a discussion of
the rationale behind the "fresh start" principle, see Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start
Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1393 (1985).
74. The Bankruptcy Code contains different sets of discharge rules depending on the nature of
the bankruptcy and identity of the debtor. See generally FERRIULL & JANGER, supra note 54,
§ 13, at 465-530.
75- 196 B.R. 225, 226 (D.P.R. 1996). Puerto Rico is treated as a state for the purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 228.
76. Id. at 226.
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moved the court to hold the Department of Treasury in contempt for the
Department's willful disregard of the automatic stay and attempted to collect
monetary damages. 77 The court conceded that "it is clear that Treasury violated
the debtors' automatic stay when Treasury filed a tax lien over debtors'
property after the Chapter 13 petition had been filed," and even extolled the
virtues of the automatic stay.7s However, the court ultimately found that it did
not have jurisdiction over the debtors' claim because the Treasury had not
waived its sovereign immunity.
79
In other instances, assertions of sovereign immunity complicate the court's
ability to issue a discharge at all. Many tax claims are nondischargeable, 80 but
in order for a claim to survive the discharge, the court must first determine
whether it is allowable. To get that determination, debtors may have to initiate
an adversary proceeding against the state. For example, claims for property
back taxes are only allowable up to the value of the property.1 In other words,
if someone has real property worth $100,000 and has been assessed with real
estate taxes for $150,000, only $oo,ooo of the claim is allowed. But, if the
state can assert its sovereign immunity and evade the substantive obligations
that the Bankruptcy Code imposes, it may be impossible for the debtor to
secure a ruling exempting her from the additional $50,000 payment.8z In short,
permitting state sovereign immunity defenses may directly undermine a
debtor's ability to vindicate the financial guarantees that federal bankruptcy
provides.
77. Id. at 228.
7s. Id.
79. Id. at 228-30.
8o. A wide variety of tax claims are entitled to priority under ii U.S.C. 5 507(a)(8) (2006), and
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) renders each of those tax claims nondischargeable.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 5 02(b)(3).
82. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 209 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9 th Cir. 2000)
(dismissing complaint to determine the amount and dischargeability of taxes owed to the
state on Eleventh Amendment grounds).
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II. RE-EVALUATING SEMINOLE TRIBE: THE BANKRUPTCY
EXCEPTION UNDER HOOD AND KATZ
A. Hood and the In Rem Exception
Almost ten years after Seminole Tribe and after repeatedly declining
opportunities to consider the question directly,8s the Court finally granted
certiorari to consider whether § 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code validly
abrogated sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings. The case, Tennessee
Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, involved a debtor, Pamela Hood, who had over
$4,000 in outstanding student loans.8s After filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
Ms. Hood sought to take advantage of a provision of the Code that allows
individuals who can show an "undue hardship" in paying off student loans to
get the loans discharged.8 ' But when she filed a complaint against the state
agency that administered the student assistance program, the state moved to
dismiss on the grounds that Congress's authorization of a suit against the state
to secure a discharge of student loans infringed on its Eleventh Amendment
immunity.86 The bankruptcy court and the Sixth Circuit denied the motion,
holding that § 106(a) validly abrogated the state government's sovereign
immunity8s and the Court granted certiorari to consider that question.
8
Instead of reaching that question, though, the Court resolved the case on
narrower grounds: writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Rehnquist concluded that
the discharge proceeding was an exercise of in rem jurisdiction and was
therefore "not a suit against the State for the purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment.",8  Bankruptcy jurisdiction, the majority reasoned, "derives not
from jurisdiction over the state or other creditors, but rather from jurisdiction
over debtors and their estates."9 In bankruptcy, the debtor turns over all of his
or her assets to the bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction for ratable
83. See Magnolia Venture Capital Corp. v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 151 F. 3d 439 (5th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1178 (1999); Wyo. Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 143 F.3d
1387 (loth Cit. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998); Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813 ( 5th
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1102 (1999).
84. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 444 (2004).
85. Generally, student loans are not subject to discharge absent a showing of "undue hardship."
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
86. Hood, 541 U.S. at 445.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 443.
8. Id.; see id. at 442, 447-49.
go. Id. at 447-48 (quoting In re Collins, 173 F.3 d 924, 929 (4 th Cir. 1999)).
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distribution.9" The court's role is to issue a judgment that determines the
universe of claims against the estate and that judgment is binding "against the
world" -including parties over whom the court would not have in personam
jurisdiction.92
The in rem exception was not entirely without precedent. Seven years
prior, the Court unanimously held in California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc. that
Eleventh Amendment immunity was not a bar to purely in rem admiralty
proceedings when the state was not in possession of the res.93 In that case,
researchers who had located a historic shipwreck within California's territorial
waters sought a determination of their ownership claim. 94 The state countered
that it had title to the wreck and asserted that its Eleventh Amendment
immunity barred any federal court from considering the researchers' claim.9
The Court rebuffed that contention, finding instead that because the
proceeding adjudicated claims to the wreck and the state had neither a
colorable claim nor possession of the res, the proceeding did not implicate state
immunity.9 6 The Hood majority thus situated the immunity exception in
discharge proceedings in the narrow niche that Deep Sea Research chiseled out
of Seminole Tribe's holding.
97
As the Court framed it, Hood was not a radical departure from the string of
recent cases broadly construing state immunity. While the decision blackened
the previously dim lines of an in rem exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity, it did not create a bankruptcy-wide exception to the Seminole Tribe
rule. Indeed, the majority reaffirmed its judgment in Seminole Tribe that
exercising in personam jurisdiction would be "an indignity to the sovereignty
of a State" and run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment.98 The decision
permitted suits to issue discharge and automatic stay orders that implicated
91. See id. at 447.
92. See id. at 447-48.
93. 523 U.S. 491,494-95 (1998).
94. Id. at 494.
9S. Id.
96. Id. at 504-08.
97. See Hood, 541 U.S. at 446-47.
98. Hood, 541 U.S. at 453. The majority recognized that the discharge proceeding at issue had
the trappings of personal jurisdiction, such as issuance of process, id. at 452-53, and the
dissent noted that the proceeding was similar in almost every meaningful respect to an
adversarial proceeding in civil litigation, id. at 457-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Nonetheless,
the majority reasoned that because the court could have discharged the debt without the
compulsory process, the mere addition of a summons would not alter the character of the
court's power as essentially in rem. Id. at 454-55.
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state interests, but it did nothing to open up the door to suits for retroactive or
monetary relief.99 Relying on Hood alone, therefore, it is difficult to see how a
trustee could have sued to recover voidable transfers or how a debtor could
have sought punitive or compensatory damages from the state for violating a
discharge or automatic stay.
B. Katz and the Bankruptcy-Wide Exception
The Court reached these issues two years later in Central Virginia
Community College v. Katz.1"' Katz arose out of a bankruptcy involving a chain
of bookstores that had made payments to a collection of state colleges shortly
before filing its bankruptcy petition. The appointed trustee, Bernard Katz,
moved to void these payments as "preferential transfers" - defined as a
payment made by an insolvent debtor to a creditor within ninety days prior to
filing for bankruptcy. 1 ' Recognizing that debtors on the brink of bankruptcy
would be tempted to apportion their assets to preferred creditors (for example,
friends and family) while leaving disfavored creditors (for example, credit card
companies) with nothing, the Code provides that those payments will be
disgorged and returned to the estate for equitable distribution among all
creditors. The college, however, filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that since it
was an arm of the state, the preference action-and § io6(a), which furnished
jurisdiction -were impermissible violations of its sovereign immunity. This
case posed a deeper challenge than Hood: the Hood majority characterized the
discharge as an in rem proceeding because it did not involve recovery of money
from the state defendant. But in Katz a judgment against Virginia's community
colleges would necessarily entail the entry of a money judgment. The Court
granted certiorari once again to determine whether Congress validly abrogated
state sovereign immunity with § lo6(a).'°2
In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected the state's claim of sovereign
immunity, but not because § io6(a) extinguished it. Rather, the majority
opinion, penned by Justice Stevens, held that the states surrendered their
sovereign immunity two hundred years prior when they ratified the
99. In fact, the Court seemed to prejudge the issue that would appear before it two years later in
Katz. See Hood, 541 U.S. at 454 ("The case before us is thus unlike an adversary proceeding
by the bankruptcy trustee seeking to recover property in the hands of the State on the
grounds that the transfer was a voidable preference.").
ioo. S46 U.S. 356 (20o6).
101. 11I U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006).
imO. Katz, 546 U.S. at 361.
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Bankruptcy Clause in Article 13 The majority reached this conclusion by
examining the legal backdrop against which that Clause was adopted. Under
the Articles of Confederation, the sovereign states had enacted a m6lange of
conflicting rules: "[U]ncoordinated actions of multiple sovereigns, each laying
claim to the debtor's body and effects according to different rules" resulted in
the imprisonment of debtors by states unwilling to accept their sister states'
discharge."0 4 Responding to this injustice, the Framers added the Bankruptcy
Clause to provide "a uniform federal response" to the patchwork of existing
state bankruptcy laws and the resulting lack of enforceability of state discharge
provisions in other states.' The majority concluded that not only did the
ratifying states cede authority to Congress to enact bankruptcy regulations,
they "agreed in the plan of the Convention not to assert any sovereign
immunity defense they might have had in proceedings brought pursuant to
'Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies.1,,
6
As evidence for its claim that the states intended to surrender their
immunity, the majority pointed to statutes that Congress enacted in the years
immediately following ratification that authorized federal courts to issue writs
of habeas corpus requiring states to release debtors from their prisons.
According to Justice Stevens, the proverbial dog did not bark: despite
heightened sensitivities regarding issues of state immunity and the "intrusion
upon state sovereignty" that the writs represented,0 7 there was "no record of
any objection ...based on an infringement of sovereign immunity," either
before or after the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment.?18 From this silence,
the majority inferred consent not just to the authorization of the writs, but to
laws designed to ensure uniformity in bankruptcy practice 9
That left the question: in which bankruptcy proceedings did the states
intend to surrender their sovereign immunity? According to the majority, the
Framers would have understood "laws on the subject of Bankruptcies" to
1o3. Id. at 362.
104. Id. at 366.
105. Id. at 369. The Bankruptcy Clause is the only Article I power apart from the Naturalization
Clause that has a uniformity requirement. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (authorizing
Congress to make "uniform Laws ... on the subject of Bankruptcies").
io6. 546 U.S. at 377.
107. Id. at 375. It was during this same period, Justice Stevens notes, that the Court handed down
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which so "shocked" the country as to impel
the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. 546 U.S. at 375 (quoting Principality of Monaco
v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934)).
1o8. 546 U.S. at 375.
iog. Id. at 377.
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encompass "more than simple adjudications of rights in the res.""' True, the
bankruptcy court's authority is principally an exercise in in rem jurisdiction,
which Hood deemed nonviolative of the Eleventh Amendment because in rem
actions "do[] not implicate States' sovereignty to nearly the same degree as
other kinds of jurisdiction."11  But the bankruptcy courts also historically
possessed authority to issue "ancillary" orders "necessary to effectuate the in
rem jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts"2- among them, the authority to
jail noncompliant third parties and recover preferential transfers." 3 According
to the majority, the Framers understood that "the jurisdiction of courts
adjudicating rights in the bankrupt estate included the power to issue
compulsory orders to facilitate the administration and distribution of the res,"
and must have intended to surrender sovereign immunity defenses in those
concededly in personam proceedings as well.1
4
Putting to rest the question that had befuddled bankruptcy courts for a
decade, the majority found that "[c]areful study and reflection have convinced
us" that the Seminole dicta applying its holding to bankruptcy was mistaken."'
In short, where Hood carved out a discharge-sized nook into sovereign
immunity jurisprudence, Katz appeared to carve out a gaping bankruptcy-sized
hole.
C. The Court's Troubled Bankruptcy Jurisprudence: A Critical Look at Hood
and Katz
The reasoning in Hood and Katz leaves much to be desired, a troubling
point because the post-Katz composition of the Court raises serious questions
about the solidity of the judgment that the Bankruptcy Clause is outside the
scope of Seminole Tribe's holding." 6 Failing to muster enough votes to overturn
Seminole Tribe, Hood and Katz sought to distinguish bankruptcy from the
remainder of Article I powers. The Court identified three factors supporting its
lio. Id. at 370-71.
mii. Id. at 362.
112. Id. at 378.
113. Id. at 370.
114. Id.
11s. Id. at 363.
116. Indeed, even scholars sympathetic to the outcome have criticized both Hood and Katz as
prejudged outcomes in vain search of principled justification. See Brubaker, Explaining Katz,
supra note 18, at 97; Brubaker, From Fictionalism, supra note 5, at 74-8o; Plank, supra note 18,
at 6o; Redish & Greenfield, supra note 13, at 48.
1590
119:156 8 2olo
BANKRUPTCY AS CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY
contention that bankruptcy is special. First, the word "uniform" in the
Bankruptcy Clause requires a bankruptcy regime that does not vary from state
to state'- an impossibility if states can escape its provisions by claiming
immunity. Second, it is evident from practices contemporary to the
Convention that the ratifying states would have understood that they were
ceding sovereignty in bankruptcy proceedings. And third, bankruptcy is unique
because its powers are premised on in rem jurisdiction. All three of these
arguments are highly disputable, which only enhances Katz's vulnerability.
Moreover, even if the Court ultimately accepts the validity of Katz, none of
these arguments resolves the question of whether states enjoy immunity from
actions for retroactive relief.
1. Uniformity
According to the Katz majority, the Framers' "primary goal" in mandating
uniform bankruptcy laws "was to prevent competing sovereigns' interference
with the debtor's discharge" and, specifically, to prevent one state from
imprisoning debtors whose debts had been discharged by another state's
courts. The majority thus concludes -based largely on the states' acquiescence
to laws enabling federal courts to liberate debtors from state prisons- that the
Framers intended to forgo sovereign immunity defenses in all core bankruptcy
proceedings to ensure uniformity.",8 There are at least two objections to the
majority's reasoning. First, one must have a particularly robust conception of
uniformity to make the move from states accepting the binding force of other
states' discharge orders to states ceding immunity in any and all bankruptcy
proceedings in which the assertion of immunity would tend to inject interstate
variance in debtor and creditor rights. History and precedent, however, ratify a
much more constrained vision of uniformity, one that sanctions a great deal of
deviation from state to state. Second, if the ill was interstate nonuniformity, it
does not follow that the only cure is wholesale displacement of state immunity.
Rather, uniformity could be achieved by a dual rule holding that states are
bound by each others' discharge orders under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
but no state can be subject to compulsory process in bankruptcy courts absent
consent.
117. A state may add its own bankruptcy protections as long as they do not conflict with the
federal Bankruptcy Code. For a related discussion, see infra note 212 and accompanying text.
ug. Katz, 546 U.S. at 377. The majority was careful to note, however, that simply labeling
something a bankruptcy law would not be sufficient to displace state sovereign immunity.
Id. at 378 n.15.
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There are two competing interpretations of the word "uniform" in the
Bankruptcy Clause. The first reads the word as imposing a requirement that
the Bankruptcy Code be geographically uniform"'9 - that is, it prohibits
Congress from enacting regionally specific bankruptcy laws. 2° Under this
view, the word "uniform" acts as a substantive constraint on Congress's
authority to promulgate bankruptcy regulations, not as a grant of power to use
otherwise impermissible means to stamp out interstate bankruptcy variance.
The second interpretation- the one adopted by the Katz majority-reads the
word to impose a more stringent requirement that the application of the
bankruptcy laws be uniform throughout the United States.' 2 ' In other words,
bankruptcy law must have the same impact on all similarly situated parties,
regardless of which states they are in. The Court has labeled this second
interpretation "personal" uniformity (as opposed to "geographical"
uniformity). " This second view leads to a more substantial conclusion than
the first: in ratifying the Bankruptcy Clause, the states did not merely cede to
Congress a bounded power to enact geographically consistent laws. Rather, the
states surrendered their authority to act in a manner that would upset the laws'
uniform application.
But this proves too much. If "uniform" means that bankruptcy law must
treat all similarly situated creditors and debtors equally, and if this requirement
is so rigid as to divest states of their immunity in proceedings where asserting
it might lead to disparate treatment, it should follow that states are prohibited
from affirmatively enacting legislation that disrupts this uniformity. In other
words, if the states surrendered their sovereign immunity to further some
overriding constitutional command of personal uniformity, one might expect
them to have surrendered in the same breath the authority to inject interstate
variance into the bankruptcy regime's treatment of individuals by passing their
own variable bankruptcy laws.'23
119. See, e.g., Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 172 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The Constitutional requirement of uniformity is a
requirement of geographic uniformity.").
120. See Bartell, supra note 5, at 57-58.
121. Katz, 546 U.S. at 377 n.13 ("Congress has the power to enact bankruptcy laws the purpose
and effect of which are to ensure uniformity in treatment of state and private creditors.").
122. Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902).
123. See Katz, 546 U.S. at 383 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing that the majority's decision is
based on the "conten[tion] that the Framers found it intolerable that bankruptcy laws could
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However, well over a hundred years of practice and doctrine affirm the
authority of the states to enact divergent bankruptcy laws-laws that
profoundly affect creditor and debtor rights depending on their state of
residence.'" Homestead exemptions are but one example: a debtor lucky
enough to have primary residence in Florida gets to exempt her house no
matter its value, whereas one with residence in Nevada is liable for the value of
her house above $55o,ooo25 The Court had previously rejected both the idea
that the Constitution requires uniform application of bankruptcy laws and the
idea that it preempts state actions that rupture uniformity in the bankruptcy
regime in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses." 6 That case considered the
constitutionality of a provision of the Bankruptcy Code that left intact each
state's unique exemption scheme. Holding that the Bankruptcy Clause
required "geographic, not personal, uniformity," the Court stated that "the
system is, in the constitutional sense, uniform throughout the United States,
when the trustee takes in each State whatever would have been available to the
creditors if the bankrupt law had not been passed." '27 In other words, Congress
is free to refrain from legislating segments of bankruptcy law, and wherever
124. Thus, Judge Haines argues that interpreting "uniform" as a grant of power to ensure
uniform application as opposed to a constraint on enacting regionally specific bankruptcy
laws "changes over a century of bankruptcy jurisprudence, and has implications far beyond
the context of suits against States." The Honorable Randolph J. Haines, Federalism Principles
in Bankruptcy After Katz, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 135, 136 (2007). For discussions of the
substantial variance in state bankruptcy laws, see Daniel A. Austin, For Debtor or Worse:
Discharge of Marital Debt Obligations Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, 51 WAYNE L. REv. 1369 (2005) (explaining the differing treatment of
discharge in domestic support obligations); Daniel A. Austin, The Bankruptcy Clause and the
Eleventh Amendment: An Uncertain Boundary Between Federalism and State Sovereignty, 42
U.S.F. L. REV. 383, 396 (2007) (explaining that many states have refused to adopt the tort of
"deepening solvency" which imposes liability on corporate officers for artificially extending
the life of moribund companies); and Paul R. Glassman, Choice of State Law in Bankruptcy
Cases: Part 1, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2005, at 32 (providing an overview of differing state
bankruptcy legislation). The Court's uniformity argument, brought to its logical conclusion,
would seem to require the invalidation of all these divergent state laws.
125. FLA. CONST. art. X, S 4; NEv. STAT. ANN. § 21.090 (West 1997).
126. 186 U.S. 181 (1902); see also Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 6o5, 613 (1918)
("Notwithstanding this requirement as to uniformity the bankruptcy acts of Congress may
recognize the laws of the State in certain particulars, although such recognition may lead to
different results in different States."). For a critique of the Moyses doctrine, see Judith
Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine
of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22 (1983) (arguing that the doctrine misreads the
Framers' intent).
127. Moyses, 186 U.S. at 19o.
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Congress is silent the states are at liberty to speak. 28 The fact that the states
speak in discordant tones is of no constitutional significance. 
129
Perhaps, then, the majority is embracing a more modest conception of
uniformity: variegated state laws are permissible, but the enforcement offederal
bankruptcy law must be unvarying across state lines. That, however, does not
require abrogating immunity in all bankruptcy proceedings. Uniformity could
just as easily be preserved by a nationwide rule that state agencies can never be
ordered to grant specific discharges or turn over preferences to a private
trustee -and that version of uniformity has the advantage of being consistent
with the prevailing interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. Granted, that
alternative seems entirely unsatisfactory because it would disable creditors and
debtors from vindicating some of their bankruptcy rights against the state. But,
as the Katz dissent points out, so long as Seminole Tribe and Florida Prepaid are
good law, the deleterious practical effects of immunity defenses are not a
cognizable argument for concluding that Congress may strip states of
immunity.13 °
2. Plan of the Convention
The Katz majority's argument that the states understood that they were
ceding their sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings -even ones that
would award money judgments from state coffers -enjoys even less support.
Given the dearth of evidence and near total absence of debate over the
128. The Katz majority never mentions Moyses except in a string citation to support the
proposition that bankruptcy jurisdiction is principally in rem. Katz, 546 U.S. at 370.
129. Some have claimed that Katz is consistent with the erosion of the Moyses doctrine in
subsequent cases-Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases (3R Act Cases), 419 U.S. 102 (1974);
and Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982). Susan Hauser, Necessary
Fictions: Bankruptcy Jurisdiction After Hood and Katz, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1181, 1229 n.331 (2008).
This is incorrect: the 3R Act Cases upheld a bankruptcy statute governing railroad
reorganization in a single locale on the grounds that "the uniformity clause was not
intended 'to hobble Congress by forcing it into nationwide enactments to deal with
conditions calling for remedy only in certain regions."' 419 U.S. at 159 (citing In re Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., 384 F. Supp. 895, 915 (1974)). In so doing, the Court may have diluted
the geographical uniformity requirement, but it never endorsed the more stringent personal
uniformity standard.
130. 546 U.S. at 384-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting); cf. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coil. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999) (conceding that uniformity in patent law is
critical, but arguing that this need is "a factor which belongs to the Article I patent-power
calculus, rather than to any determination of whether a state plea of sovereign immunity
deprives a patentee of property without due process of law").
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Bankruptcy Clause, the historical evidence for this proposition is slim and
almost entirely speculative.
31
Unable to cite any contemporary statements confirming the supposed
intent to surrender immunity, the majority instead infers such a design by
cobbling together three historical observations: first, the Framers were
primarily concerned with state nonobservance of sister-state discharge orders;
second, state submission to federal habeas jurisdiction over debtors
incarcerated in state prisons evinces a settled understanding that the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar such proceedings; and third, that while bankruptcy
jurisdiction was primarily in rem, bankruptcy courts have historically
possessed in personam powers to effectuate in rem adjudications. From there,
the majority makes the inferential leap that the "coverage [of the states' cession
of immunity] encompasses the entire 'subject of Bankruptcies."'" 32
The problems with this reasoning are manifold. First, as the dissent points
out, the lack of outcry over the writs proves little given that "the habeas writ
was well established by the time of the framing, and consistent with then-
prevailing notions of sovereignty."'33 Second, even if the states had understood
the Bankruptcy Clause as extinguishing sovereign immunity in habeas
proceedings, that means nothing for the myriad of other proceedings where the
state is a party with financial interests at stake. 34 Issuing a writ of habeas for a
debtor held in state prison at the behest of a private creditor is qualitatively
different from suing a state for relief from debt or recovery of assets -unlike
the former, the latter entails a direct draw on the state's coffers.'35 To this, the
majority offers an unsatisfactory response: the Framers granted the entire
power of bankruptcy law to Congress and the Framers understood that body of
law to include the bankruptcy court's traditional power to retrieve preferential
transfers.3 6 But the majority adduced no evidence that the bankruptcy courts
131. Katz, 546 U.S. at 379 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Bankruptcy Clause was a last minute
addition to Article I and was subject to minimal debate. See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 4-5 (William S. Hein & Co. 1994) (1935). The only recorded
discussion of the bankruptcy power was a brief exchange between two drafters airing
concerns about the imposition of the death sentence for debtors. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 489 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
132. 546 U.S. at 370 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 388-90 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 387.
135. See id. (noting that "it was a particularly grave offense to a State's sovereignty to be hauled
into court by a private citizen and forced to make payments on debts").
136. Id. at 370 (majority opinion) ("The power granted to Congress by that Clause is a unitary
concept rather than an amalgam of discrete segments.").
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
had ever wielded- or the Framers thought they were capable of wielding- that
retrieval power against the states.
The dissent points out a third flaw in the majority's interpretation of
history: it does not follow from evidence that the Framers sought a uniform
body of bankruptcy law that the Framers sought to waive the state's immunity
to suit in bankruptcy proceedings. 137 If, as the majority's discussion suggests,
the Framers' primary concern was the enforceability of discharge orders in all
states, the solution would be to bind states through the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, not to subject states to private suit."8 Even if the Framers harbored a
broader desire to preempt all inconsistent bankruptcy state laws, that does not
necessarily mean that they intended to render the states susceptible to private
suit. Numerous decisions left untouched by Katz have held that the state's
authority to legislate and its ability to avoid suit without consent are two
independent facets of sovereignty. 39 Thus, the Framers may have eliminated
the states' sovereign capacity to enact regulations contrary to federal
bankruptcy law while simultaneously preserving the states' immunity shield
from private suits brought to enforce that body of federal law. This bifurcated
view of sovereignty has inspired intense academic criticism.1 4' But it remains
the prevailing one.
3. The In Rem Exception
Katz and Hood build on the fact that the bankruptcy court's authority is
principally in rem-that is, that the proceeding is directed at property as
opposed to persons. However, while the in rem/in personam distinction has
descriptive utility, 4' it is of little relevance in determining whether bankruptcy
proceedings are consistent with the precepts of state sovereign immunity. The
137. Id. at 379-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards
a Constitutional Theory ofBankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 605, 643 (2008).
138. 546 U.S. at 390-91 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Indeed, as the dissent observes, the bankruptcy
issue arose in the Constitutional Convention during discussions of the scope of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.
139. Id. at 384 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996)
("Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a
particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by
private parties against unconsenting States.").
140. See supra note 13.
141. It also has limited utility in context of establishing a court's personal jurisdiction over a
defendant. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 620-21 (1990) (suggesting that
the in ren-/in personam distinction is relevant to ascertaining whether the court can assert
personal jurisdiction over an individual consistent with the requirements of due process).
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two premier values that sovereign immunity furthers are staving off suits that
threaten "the financial integrity of the States"'42 and guarding against the
"indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at
the instance of private parties.1' 43 Even the purest in rem action, the general
discharge, has significant effects on state coffers. From a financial standpoint,
there is no difference between an order discharging a $10,000 debt to the state
and a judgment against the state awarding $o,ooo in monetary damages. The
discharge may issue without the state having to expend the resources of
dispatching a lawyer to court; but the same could be said for default judgments
when monetary damages are at issue. A state that wishes to defend its financial
interests in bankruptcy has no choice but to participate in the proceeding. The
Supreme Court recognized the artificiality of the in rem/in personam
distinction in Shaffer v. Heitner by agreeing with "[t]he overwhelming majority
of commentators [who] have also rejected [the] premise that a proceeding
'against' property is not a proceeding against the owners of that property.' ' 44
"All proceedings, like all rights," it concluded, "are really against persons." 
45
142. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999).
143. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1992) (quoting In
re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)); see Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S.
743, 747 (2002) (extending state sovereign immunity beyond the confines of judicial
proceedings on the grounds that the Eleventh Amendment protects states from having to
defend themselves even in a federal administrative proceeding); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at
58 (quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 506 U.S. at 146); id. at 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Dignity has been a prominent theme in state sovereign immunity cases. See, e.g., Fed. Mar.
Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 760 (holding that sovereign immunity protected states from
adjudication at a federal agency responding to a private party's complaint of a violation of a
federal statute regulating shipping); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 715 (commenting that "[t]he
generation that designed and adopted our federal system considered immunity from private
suits central to sovereign dignity"); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268
(1997) (stating that "the dignity and respect afforded a State, which the immunity is
designed to protect, are placed in jeopardy" by private suits in federal courts, regardless of
the basis of federal courts' jurisdiction); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 506 U.S. at 146
(permitting states to appeal the denial of sovereign immunity defenses to ensure "that the
States' dignitary interests can be fully vindicated"). For a critique of the Court's
characterization of immunity as a product of state dignity, see Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye
Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003).
144. 433 U.S. 186, 205 (1977); see also id. at 212 ("The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over
property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports
an ancient form without substantial modem justification."). This accords with the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments: "The distinction between 'in rem' and 'quasi in rem'
jurisdiction, on the one hand, and 'in personam' jurisdiction, on the other hand, is in many
respects elusive. Especially is this so when it is recognized that all exercises of jurisdiction
have the purpose and effect of determining interests of persons." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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As to the second interest, the only way to maintain that bankruptcy orders
do not implicate the states' dignity interest in avoiding compulsory process is
to decouple the initial in rem adjudication from its enforcement. An automatic
stay is a universal injunction prohibiting creditors from recovering their
property under threat of judicial retaliation. A general discharge is a court order
that terminates creditors' property rights and renders recovery of those
erstwhile debts unlawful. Even if one thinks the initial orders are not
sufficiently coercive to implicate Eleventh Amendment immunity, any effort to
enforce them - that is, the injunction enjoining collection - surely is. Any state
agency that disregards the automatic stay or discharge will be hauled into court
and ordered to desist.4
6
But even if one accepted that in rem proceedings did not infringe on state
sovereign immunity, the outcomes in Hood and Katz hardly follow, for neither
OF JUDGMENTS 5 6 cmt. a. (1982); see also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Ideology, Due Process and
Civil Procedure, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 265, 294 (arguing that "one of the effects of mid-
twentieth century jurisprudence was the collapse of the distinction between personal and
property rights" and that "[w] ithout a distinction between personal and property rights, the
distinction between in personam and in rem jurisdiction seemed to lose its justification").
145. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207 n.22 (quoting Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76 (19oo),
appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (19oo)). Ralph Brubaker also makes a strong case that the
Framers viewed bankruptcy discharge proceedings as an exercise of in personam, not in rem
jurisdiction. See Brubaker, From Fictionalism, supra note 5, at 64. The Court's judgment in
Deep Sea Research adds only a wrinkle: that case hinged on the fact that the state had failed
to assert any colorable claim to the property and it was not in possession of the res.
California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 498-501, 504 (1998). It was thus
inapposite to discharge proceedings where the state always has a colorable claim to the
property - usually derived from its tax code - and preferential recovery proceedings where
the state does possess the res. Even after Deep Sea Research, the scope of the in rem exception
was largely unsettled. Several pre-Deep Sea Research cases had suggested that the Eleventh
Amendment barred all suits in federal court to adjudicate state interests in property. See,
e.g., Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("A federal court
cannot summon a State before it in a private action seeking to divest the State of a property
interest."); Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 682 (1982) (plurality
opinion) ("The court did not have power ...to adjudicate the State's interest in the
property without the State's consent."); id. at 711 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("It is ... beyond reasonable dispute that the Eleventh Amendment bars
a federal court from deciding the rights and obligations of a State in a contract unless the
State consents."). Justice O'Connor, who delivered the Deep Sea Research opinion for the
unanimous Court, did not purport to overturn those decisions (though several concurring
justices seemed to welcome such a move, see 523 U.S. at 509 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at
51o (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Rather, she framed the decision as addressing the limited
issue of in rem admiralty proceedings where the state lacked a colorable claim to the res. Id.
at 506 (majority opinion).
146. See Brubaker, From Fictionalism, supra note 5, at 98-99, 125 (criticizing the characterization
of discharge as in rem as a "fiction").
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of those proceedings was actually in rem. The debtor in Hood filed an adversary
complaint against the state to secure a student loan discharge. 147 As Professor
Hauser notes, the Court committed an oversight by equating this with the
general discharge for the purposes of its in rem analysis. The latter is "an
undifferentiated, take it or leave it" order that is good against the world and
requires minimal process and notice."4" The former is governed by a different
section of the Code,'149 requires an adversary proceeding against an individual
creditor, and requires all the due process protections of a civil suit.' Moreover,
this type of action has no effect on the bankruptcy estate; rather, "if the
debtor/plaintiff prevails in this type of action, only the creditor's rights outside
of bankruptcy are affected." '' In response to these objections," 2 the Hood
majority offered that "[n]o matter how difficult Congress has decided to make
the discharge of student loan debt, the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is
premised on the res, not on the persona.""' But where a privately initiated suit
forces a state to defend its claim in court or default, it would seem that the
court has overstepped that "premise."' 4
The Court's reasoning becomes even more problematic in Katz. The Katz
majority recognized that preference actions entail the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction but insisted that this exercise was redeemed because it is ancillary
to and in furtherance of the court's legitimate in rem jurisdiction.' As a logical
matter, it is hard to see how the advancement of proceedings inoffensive to
state sovereignty inoculates against constitutional challenge a suit that clearly
does offend state sovereignty. The majority's position in Hood was that an
exercise of in rem jurisdiction is legitimate because it is not in personam.,
6
When one combines that proposition with Katz, the output is a dizzyingly
147. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006).
148. Hauser, supra note 129, at 1205.
149. 11 U.S.C. § 523. Even the amount of process varies. See FED R. BANKR. P. 7001.
iso. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7002.
151. Hauser, supra note 129, at 1223.
152. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 456 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("[T]he adversary proceeding here clearly constitutes a suit against the State for sovereign
immunity purposes."); id. at 457-59 (itemizing elements of compulsory process in the
discharge action).
153. Id. at 450.
154. Hauser, supra note 129, at 1223.
155. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 347,373 (2006).
156. Hood, 541 U.S. at 447-49 (explaining that discharge is an in rem action); id. at 452-53 ("Nor
is there any dispute that, if the Bankruptcy Court had to exercise personal jurisdiction over
[the state agency], such an adjudication would implicate the Eleventh Amendment.").
1599
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circular paralogism: in personam jurisdiction is legitimate because it is
necessary to effectuate in rem jurisdiction, which is legitimate because it is not
in personam.'57
These infirmities in the majority's reasoning are reflected in the dissent's
parting jab: "It would be one thing if the majority simply wanted to overrule
Seminole Tribe altogether. That would be wrong, but at least the terms of our
disagreement would be transparent. The majority's action today, by contrast, is
difficult to comprehend."
8
III.AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND FOR ABROGATING STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Given the shortcomings in the majorities' reasoning in Hood and Katz and
the relatively short life expectancy of rulings defining the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment,15 9 scholars and practitioners may once again find themselves in
search of an alternative constitutional underpinning on which to anchor
Congress's authority to override state immunity in bankruptcy proceedings.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides just such a foothold. The five members
of the Seminole Tribe majority who declared that Congress could not invoke
Article I to displace state sovereign immunity have repeatedly affirmed that
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a valid source of abrogation
authority. 6' Thus, if bankruptcy rights could be lodged in one of the
157. As Professor Hauser notes, the Court's choice of words-"ancillary to in rem" -"bears a
superficial resemblance to ancillary jurisdiction, and it is possible that the Court's word
choice in Katz was influenced by this similarity." Hauser, supra note 129, at 1217. That
doctrine-also known as pendent or supplemental jurisdiction-was developed to permit
federal courts to hear claims outside their subject matter jurisdiction where such jurisdiction
was necessary "to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings,
vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994). For a good discussion of the doctrine, see Robert G. Bone,
Revisiting the Policy Case for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 IND. L.J. 139 (1998). However, these
jurisdiction-extending devices cannot justify the conclusion in Katz that bankruptcy courts
may intrude on sovereign immunity to enforce in rem judgments. Sovereign immunity is,
by its nature, a limitation on federal court subject matter jurisdiction and the Court has held
that "neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may override the
Eleventh Amendment." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121
(1984).
158. Katz, 546 U.S. at 393 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
ig. See supra Introduction and notes lo, n1.
16o. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 8o (2000); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59-6 o (1996).
16oo
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substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress might be able
to re-enact § 1o6(a) without resort to the problematic-and potentially
vulnerable - theories propounded in Hood and Katz.
The first hurdle is finding a substantive provision that could house
bankruptcy rights. Thus far, courts have resoundingly rejected efforts to
characterize state bankruptcy violations as violations of substantive due process
or the Privileges and Immunities Clause.161 The reason this approach has failed
is because a substantive due process challenge usually requires a showing either
that the government action is arbitrary and substantively unjustifiable,"' or
that it assaults a fundamental interest. 66 The argument that state defiance of
federal bankruptcy law is arbitrary and substantively unjustifiable would not
seem a difficult one: the Supremacy Clause binds the states to the Bankruptcy
Code, and there is no legal justification for flouting mandatory federal
regulations. Indeed, the United States could, if Congress so authorized,
successfully prosecute a suit against a state that violated any portion of federal
bankruptcy law. 6 4 However, the fact that state noncompliance in bankruptcy is
definitionally without legal justification does not mean that these violations
implicate substantive due process. "Arbitrary" in the substantive due process
context is a term of art: as Justice Souter wrote in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
"only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the
constitutional sense. . . . [F]or half a century now we have spoken of the
161. See Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 133 F.3 d
237, 243-45 (3 d Cir. 1998); Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths of D.C.,
Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (4 th Cir. 1997); Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset Mgmt.
Co. (In re Estate of Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 245 (sth Cir. 1997); Quesada v. P.R. Dep't of
Health (In re Arecibo Cmty. Health Care, Inc.), 233 B.R. 625, 629 (D.P.R. 1999); United
States v. Neb. Dep't of Revenue (In re Doiel), 228 B.R. 439, 443-49 (D.S.D. 1998). But see
Wyo. Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 209 B.R. 540, 551-55 (D. Wyo. 1997)
(concluding that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity in bankruptcy
proceedings under the Fourteenth Amendment).
16a. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) ("[T]he Due Process Clause ... was
'intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.'"
(quoting Hurtado v. California, i1o U.S. 516, 527 (1884))); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 8o (1992) ("[T]he Due Process Clause . . . bars certain arbitrary, wrongful
government actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.'"
(quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (199o))); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v.
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) ("The question ... is whether ... [the defendant] acted
arbitrarily .. ").
163. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 229-30 (rights implicated by substantive due process must bear a
"resemblance to the fundamental interests that previously have been viewed as implicitly
protected by the Constitution").
164. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup. CT.
REv. 1, 56-S7.
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cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the
conscience. ''' 6s The Court has imposed this threshold requirement that the
challenged conduct shock the conscience out of a concern that if every arbitrary
official act gave rise to a substantive due process challenge, the Due Process
Clause would be reduced to a mere "font of tort law." 166 Conduct that shocks
the conscience includes actions along the lines of forcibly pumping a criminal's
stomach for evidence of drug use. 6, It is difficult to imagine the Court placing
the state's violation of a discharge order or refusal to turn over preferential
transfers in the same category.
The argument that bankruptcy implicates fundamental rights is even more
beset since the Court declared over thirty years ago in United States v. Kras that
there is no constitutionally protected right to a discharge -the oldest and most
fundamental guarantee afforded in bankruptcy. 16' That decision is fatal to any
theory that bankruptcy rights are somehow embedded in the constitutional
fabric itself.16 In his scholarship, Judge Haines has suggested that one way to
overcome Kras is to recharacterize bankruptcy protections as privileges and
immunities . 7° This argument as well has enjoyed little traction inside the
academic community17' and has been almost universally rejected by courts.
72
165. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). But see Schware v. Bd. of Bar
Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) (finding a substantive due process violation when state
officials denied bar admission to an applicant with "no basis for their finding that he fail[ed]
to meet" applicable standards).
166. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)); see also id. at 847 n.8
("[E]xecutive action challenges raise a particular need to preserve the constitutional
proportions of constitutional claims, lest the Constitution be demoted to what we have
called a font of tort law. Thus, in a due process challenge to executive action, the threshold
question is whether the behavior of the government officer is so egregious, so outrageous,
that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.")
167. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
168. 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973). Furthermore, the Court has never subjected policies impacting
property rights to strict scrutiny and has only twice in modem times struck down a state
policy for violating substantive property rights. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996).
169. On the contrary, the first permanent federal bankruptcy act was in 1898. Douglas G. Baird,
A World Without Bankruptcy, 5c LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 173, 174 n.7 (1987).
17o. Haines, supra note 5.
171. See Patricia L. Barsalou & Scott A. Stengel, Ex parte Young: Relativity in Practice, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 455, 465-67 (1998) (arguing that bankruptcy does not further any recognized
Fourteenth Amendment aims); Bartell, supra note 5, at 31-35; Klee, Johnston & Winston,
supra note 52, at 1579-84 (1999) (arguing that bankruptcy is not connected to any traditional
Fourteenth Amendment aim, though allowing for the possibility that Congress could
reenact § 1o6(a) under the Due Process Clause); Chad J. Kutmas, Comment, Piercing
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The biggest obstacle to the adoption of that theory is not lack of historical
support or cogency, but rather judicial inertia: the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, notwithstanding one recent invocation,"' is largely dead letter, having
been-in Justice Thomas's words- "sapped... of any meaning" over a century
ago in the Slaughter House Cases.74
If Congress were able to augment the body of rights encompassed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Kras Court's conclusion that the Constitution
does not guarantee a right to bankruptcy might not be so problematic. But
under City ofBoerne v. Flores, Congress has no such authority. 7 City of Boerne,
announced a mere year after Seminole Tribe by the same majority, involved a
challenge to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Congress had
enacted the RFRA, pursuant to its Section 5 powers, to overturn the judgment
in Employment Division v. Smith that individuals could not launch a Free
Exercise Clause claim against "non-discriminatory laws of general
applicability" that had incidental discriminatory effects on religious groups. 6
Under the RFRA, the courts would be obliged to subject all such laws to the
strictest scrutiny. The Court struck down the law on the grounds that it was an
illegitimate attempt to declare the substance of constitutional rights, not
enforce them, remarking: "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
changing what the right is. It has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the
power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.'
' 1
Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy: Myth or Reality?, 37 TULSA L. REV. 457, 475 (2001)
(arguing that the Supreme Court's holding that discharge is not a constitutional right
forecloses re-enactment under Section s).
172. See Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 133 F.3d
237, 243-45 (3d Cir. 1998); Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset Mgmt. Co. (In re Estate of
Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1997); Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative
Goldsmiths of D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (4 th Cir. 1997); Quesada v. P.R. Dep't of
Health (In re Arecibo Cmty. Health Care, Inc.), 233 B.R. 625, 629 (D.P.R. 1999); United
States v. Neb. Dep't of Revenue (In re Doiel), 228 B.R. 439,443-49 (D.S.D. 1998).
173. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 489-90 (1999). Some scholars spoke prematurely of a revival
after Saenz. See Haines, supra note 5, at 67-68.
174. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 527 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
175. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
176. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
177. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. The Court reaffirmed this decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000), which invalidated a provision of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) that subjected states to suit against state employers for age
discrimination; and again in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 365 (2OO), invalidating a provision of the American Disabilities Act (ADA) that allowed
suits against states by private individuals for rational discrimination against disabled people.
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If the Court has disclaimed any inherent constitutional right to bankruptcy
protections and disempowered Congress from defining what rights the
Constitution protects, how can state violations of bankruptcy law ever violate
the Fourteenth Amendment? The answer lies in the Court's property and
procedural due process jurisprudence. The Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state may "deprive any person of... property, without due process of
law.", 8 Unlike other rights such as life, liberty, free speech, and trial by jury
that emanate from the Constitution itself, "property" emanates from positive
law. 179 As such, the legislature has substantial leeway in dictating its content.
Importantly, the kinds of property that are cognizable under the Due Process
Clause are not limited to real and personal property. Since its landmark
decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court has extended due process protections to
a new body of property known as statutory entitlements. "o The statutory
entitlement forms of property have encompassed a wide array of benefits-
welfare, government employment, licenses, public education-but they share
three common attributes: each has an easily accessible monetary value, each is
grounded in positive law, and each carries restraints on officials' discretion to
terminate or deny the benefit. 's These constrains give individuals who meet
the statutory criteria a legitimate expectation in law to receive the
entitlement.82
This Part argues that the Bankruptcy Code comprises an assemblage of
statutory entitlements that constitute property cognizable under the Due
Process Clause, and that a state that trespasses on these rights acts without
affording adequate process violates the Fourteenth Amendment. As such,
Congress may invoke its powers under Section 5 to secure the property
interests the Bankruptcy Code generates against state infringements.
The claim that bankruptcy protections are cognizable property interests is
in many ways unremarkable. Like many of the benefits that the Court has
classified as protected property, bankruptcy protections are creatures of federal
Both decisions concluded that the offending provisions would render unlawful large swaths
of conduct permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment.
178. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
179. In the prison context, for example, the Court has largely abandoned the positive law
approach to finding liberty interests and imposed a substantive requirement that the interest
be of a certain import. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
i8o. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
181. See infra Part W.
182. Perry v. Sindermann, 4o8 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972).
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law. 8' The provisions in this legal regime -the right to an automatic stay, the
discharge, and the right to void preferential transfers (to name a few) -are
designed to protect parties in bankruptcy proceedings against the property
decimating consequences of insolvency. Because these protections operate by
rearranging and suspending financial liabilities, it is impossible to deny that
they have "some ascertainable monetary value."' 8' Furthermore, bankruptcy
law gives rise to many expectations: whenever individuals engage in an
economic transaction they do so against the backdrop of these protections and
they have a legally grounded basis for the expectation that should they become
a party in a bankruptcy action, their property rights will be secured according
to the dictates of the Code.
There are also several unusual aspects about casting bankruptcy rights as
protected property interests and using their constitutional status as a hook to
invoke Section 5. First, there is a federalist dimension in bankruptcy that is
lacking in most statutory entitlement cases. Usually, the legal feature that turns
a government-conferred privilege into a protected property interest is self-
imposed constraints on agency discretion -usually in the form of statutory
criteria that inscribe circumstances in which the government entity must
accord the benefit. Think, for example, of a state law that says any claimant
with a yearly income less than $20,000 is entitled to welfare payments. The
constitutionally protected entitlement springs from the state legislature's
withdrawal of the state welfare agency's discretion to deny payment to
claimants making less than the specified amount. But what the state legislature
giveth it can taketh away: since the Due Process Clause is largely agnostic as to
the substantive content of the welfare regime, the state may, without
constitutional objection,' raise the recipient cut-off to $40,000 or even
terminate the entire welfare regime."" But in bankruptcy, what limits-or,
183. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999)
(assuming that patents are a constitutionally protected property that binds the states); see
also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (acknowledging a property interest in benefits
provided under Social Security Act); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)
(acknowledging a property interest in continued employment with a federal agency, an
interest created by federal statute); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (finding a
property interest in continued receipt of financial aid under the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program).
184. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766 (2005).
18s. See Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in DuE PROCESS: NoMos
XVIII 182, 19o (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977).
186. The only qualification comes from the largely moribund doctrine on irrebuttable
presumptions, which suggests that the statutory criteria for a benefit scheme must have
some rational justification. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973)
16o 5
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
rather, eliminates- state discretion are not self-imposed statutory criteria. It is
the federal Bankruptcy Code, which is imposed from above and made binding
on the states by the Supremacy Clause. Thus, it is simply outside the
competency of the state to terminate benefits guaranteed by the Bankruptcy
Code. Federally conferred bankruptcy protections are not the state's to grant
and they are not the state's to deny.
A second and related oddity is how state bankruptcy violations could sound
in procedural due process. Usually the inquiry in a procedural due process
claim is, how much procedure must a state provide when it deprives an
individual of some species of property? But implicit in that question is the
assumption the state could ever lawfully conduct such a deprivation. If the
preceding analysis is correct, the state may never lawfully infringe on federally
secured bankruptcy rights -asking "how much process" is due in this context
is akin to a court asking what sort of hearing a state must provide before its law
enforcement officer can beat up an innocent bystander. Nonetheless, for
doctrinally convoluted reasons explained below, the Court would likely be
amenable to a procedural due process framing of state infringements in
bankruptcy. This Note does not attempt to answer the "how much process is
due" question from scratch: Congress has already answered that question by
specifying the procedures governing the adjudication of claims in
bankruptcy. 87 Rather, I argue a more basic point: for a state to adhere to these
congressionally mandated procedures, the state must first show up -it cannot
assert its sovereign immunity any moreso than the state welfare agency could
have in Goldberg v. Kelly.
(striking down a provision denying eligibility for food stamps to the entire household where
a member of that household above eighteen years of age was claimed as a dependent for tax
purposes).
187. See FED. R. BANKR. P. (2009). I do not mean to suggest that these procedures are
constitutionally mandatory because Congress enacted them. In Loudermill, the Court
established that determining the substance of the property right was the prerogative of the
legislature, while determining what procedures that must accompany the deprivation is the
prerogative of the court. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
Instead, I maintain that if the Court were to apply the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to
ascertain the quantum of due process in bankruptcy proceedings, it would arrive at
something akin to the procedures outlined in the Code. And even if its test required less,
Congress should be able to provide for enhanced procedural protections via Section 5. See
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garnett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) ("Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce the substantive guarantees
contained in S 1 by enacting 'appropriate legislation.' Congress is not limited to mere
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This Part proceeds as follows: first, I disaggregate the Due Process Clause
into its three constituent elements- the "property," the "deprivation," and the
deficient provision of "due process of law" - and explicate the operation of each
element in the bankruptcy context. I will also engage recent doctrinal
developments in the statutory entitlement doctrine, including cases like Town
of Castle Rocklss and College Savings Bank'8 which have constricted the body of
statutory entitlements that qualify as protected property, and explain why
these cases do not undermine my claim that bankruptcy rights are cognizable
interests under the Due Process Clause. The final section will explain how,
consistent with the Court's decisions in City of Boerne and Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank'9" that crimped
Congress's Section 5 powers, Congress may nonetheless invoke that authority
to displace state immunity in bankruptcy proceedings.
A. ".... property..."
Before an individual can invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause,
she must first satisfy the threshold condition of showing a property interest.
The case for treating rights in bankruptcy as protected property interests draws
on a series of cases from the 1970S that instigated a profound revolution in the
anatomy of constitutional property. Prior to the Court's landmark decision in
Goldberg v. Kelly, the only property interests that the Constitution secured
against government interference "were those that would enjoy protection at
common law against invasion by private parties."' 9' Property in the colloquial
sense-actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money 92 - qualified for
constitutional protection; state-granted privileges such as government
employment 93 and licenses did not.' 94 This so-called rights/privileges
distinction gradually came under attack, most notably by Yale Professor
Charles Reich who argued that the dichotomy was an anachronism in an age in
188. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
189. Coll. Sav. Bankv. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
190. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
191. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HA.v. L. REv. 1667,
1717 (1975).
192. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REv. 885, 971-72
(2000).
193. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 59 (D.C. Cit. 1950), afrd by an equally divided Court, 341
U.S. 918 (1951).
194. See Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442,451-56 (1954).
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which individuals relied on government benefits like jobs, education, and social
security for their livelihoods.' 9
In Goldberg and Roth, the Court endorsed Reich's position and rejected the
"wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to
govern the applicability of procedural due process rights.",96 In its stead, the
Court adopted a new definition of constitutional property that embraced
traditional property rights as well as government benefits: the statutory
entitlement. This newly conceived property was defined by two elements.91 r
First, it had to be grounded in positive law. "Property interests," the Court
declared, "are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law."' 98 Second, the benefit had to
have a nondiscretionary component-that is, if the claimant satisfied the
specified criteria, the government agency had to confer the benefit.' 99 A mere
"abstract need or desire" for a benefit does not suffice; rather, the claimant
must have "a legitimate claim of entitlement to it" founded on positive law.2"'
Deploying this definition, the Court has found that individuals have
constitutionally cognizable property interests in welfare,2"' governmental
employment, 2  driver's licenses,"' utilities, 0 4  education,0 ' and even
19S. Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245 (1965); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
196. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
197. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982).
198. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
199. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) ("Our cases recognize that a
benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their
discretion."); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (public support payments to be
continued unless recipient not qualified). This has often been characterized as a "for cause"
requirement. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)
(holding that receipt of services from public utility was not terminable "except for good and
sufficient cause" (quoting Farmer v. Nashville, 156 S.W. 189, 19o (Tenn. 1913))); Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 n.8 (1976) (finding determinative that public employment was
terminable at will, rather than for cause); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 56S, 573-574 (197S) (public
education must be continued absent "misconduct"); Roth, 408 U.S. at 578 (distinguishing a
situation in which nonrenewal of state college professor's employment was authorized only
for "sufficient cause").
aoo. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
2o. Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254.
2z. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Roth, 408 U.S. 564.
203. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
2o4. Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at io.
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unadjudicated causes of action.2o 6 Critically, it has done so without ever
insinuating that any of those interests are protected by substantive due
process.2°7
As I explain below, the Court has reworked the doctrine such that not all
statutory entitlements qualify as property interests. Being grounded in state
law and constraining discretion is no longer sufficient: to achieve status as
cognizable property, the benefit must also have a readily ascertainable
monetary value and it must impart unto its recipient some right to exclude. But
before moving to those additional attributes, it is important to first establish
bankruptcy protections' bone fides as statutory entitlements.
Bankruptcy protections indisputably meet the first condition-that the
benefit be grounded in positive law. The debtor's right to the automatic stay
and discharge and the creditors' rights to equitable recovery emanate from the
federal Bankruptcy Code. While the Roth Court offered state law as an
illustration of a place from which property rights originate, nothing in the
Court's procedural due process jurisprudence suggests that an entitlement
sourced in federal law merits any less safeguarding.2°8 On the contrary, the
Court recognized in Florida Prepaid that patents, which owe their existence to
federal law, are property for the purposes of the Due Process Clause.2"9
The more interesting issue is how bankruptcy protections meet the second
condition-the requirement that the law minting the benefit also constrains
agency discretion in a manner that gives individuals a legally grounded
205. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
2o6. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982) (collecting cases).
207. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229-30 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)
(suggesting that continued enrollment in medical school does not qualify as substantive due
process right); Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 44o U.S. 194, 198 (1979) (per curiam)
(finding that the school board's refusal to renew teacher's contract does not rise to level of
substantive due process violation because the teacher's interest in employment was not
similar enough to interests in "basic matters of procreation, marriage, and family life").
208. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (involving a property interest in
continued the receipt of disability benefits under Social Security Act); Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134 (1974) (involving a property interest in the continued employment with federal
agency, an interest created by federal statute); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(involving a property interest in the continued receipt of financial aid under Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program); Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62
COpNEL L. REV. 405, 435 n.194 (1977); see also Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Nelson, 872
F.2d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Congress may, through the enactment of legislation, create
a substantive entitlement to a particular governmental benefit."); Devine v. Cleland, 616
F.2d lo8o, io86 (9 th Cir. 198o) (recognizing a property interest in federal veterans
benefits).
2o9. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999).
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expectation to receive it. Usually, the sovereign entity that provides the benefit
and the sovereign entity that carries out the deprivation are one and the same.
Thus, when the court inquires into the existence of a protected property
interest, the question it asks is: did the state regulations establishing a benefit
limit the state's discretion to terminate the benefit?"' But here, the source of
the entitlement and the entity effecting the deprivation are different and-
crucially- unequal sovereigns. So the question becomes: do federal regulations
establishing bankruptcy benefits limit the state's authority to deny those
benefits? The answer, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, is unequivocally yes.
As explained above, the debate within the Court is not whether Article I is a
fount of authority to impose binding obligations on the states; it is whether
Article I permits Congress to use a particular technique of enforcement-
authorizing privfate suits against the state.21" ' The resolution of the latter dispute
has no bearing on the well-established principle that Congress may, under
Article I, regulate state conduct in the realm of bankruptcy and that the
Supremacy Clause strips states of their discretion to defy those regulations."'
The combined effect of the Bankruptcy Code and the Supremacy Clause is
to accord debtors and creditors legitimate expectations that should they
become embroiled in bankruptcy proceedings, they will enjoy all the
protections the federal bankruptcy regime provides.1 3 Just as the indigent who
satisfies the eligibility criteria of the welfare statute has a claim of entitlement
to a welfare check, the debtor who satisfies the dischargeability criteria in the
bankruptcy statute has a claim of entitlement to relief from outstanding debt.
The debtor has a legitimate expectation, grounded in federal law, that all debt
collection efforts will halt upon her filing of a bankruptcy petition; she further
210. See Judith Resnik, The Story of Goldberg: Why This Case Is Our Shorthand, in CIVIL
PROCEDURE STORIES 473, 502 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008).
211. See supra notes 38-40.
212. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (invalidating under the Supremacy Clause a
state statute enforced by a state agency that provided for the recovery of tort claims in
violation of the Bankruptcy Act's discharge provisions, and remarking that "'acts of the State
Legislatures . . .[which] interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in
pursuance of the constitution,' are invalid under the Supremacy Clause." (quoting Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824)) (alteration and emphasis in original)); Van
Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225, 228 (1931) (holding that realization on state tax lien
'must yield" to the requirements of bankruptcy law).
213. A possible counter is that individuals cannot really claim to have a legitimate expectation to
bankruptcy entitlements where a constitutional amendment bars them from bringing suit
against the state to enforce those entitlements. This argument misses the point. The
legitimate expectation stems from something antecedent to the enforcement question-
namely, the assumption that states will act in a lawful manner consistent with their
obligations under binding federal bankruptcy law.
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has a legally secured interest that, at the end of her bankruptcy, late-moving
creditors will not attempt to reclaim discharged debts. The creditors' statutory
entitlements in bankruptcy are no less concrete. Each creditor has a legitimate
expectation, grounded in federal law, that it will receive its fair share of the
estate according to its placement in the Code's statutory hierarchy; each
creditor has a related legally grounded expectation that the state will not
diminish the pool of distributable assets by retaining pre-petition transfers or
collecting in violation of the automatic stay.
Not only do bankruptcy protections meet the criteria for statutory
entitlements protected by the Due Process Clause, they are in many ways
analogous to the welfare payments that occasioned the articulation of the "new
property." The Court itself has recognized that bankruptcy is a form of social
welfare." 4 As explained above, one of the animating purposes behind the
bankruptcy system is to give the honest, but unfortunate debtor an
opportunity to throw off crippling debts and start anew. 15 A vast majority of
individuals who declare Chapter 13 bankruptcy do so because economic
dislocation cost them their jobs or because unforeseen medical expenses drove
them into poverty." 6 For many, bankruptcy is the last resort when the
standard social welfare systems prove insufficient, and the consequence for an
individual's livelihood of a state violating discharge and demanding payment is
severe. Even for the corporate debtor,"' the welfare analogy has traction.
Corporations often file bankruptcy petitions to prevent creditors from
terminating leases, levying bank accounts, or repossessing equipment and
inventory, and bringing business to a halt. In other words, bankruptcy
protections may be the only things that stand between successful
reorganization and forced liquidation.
Of course, the parties in bankruptcy are differently situated from the
claimants in welfare termination cases. In the latter cases, the recipients are
challenging the termination of an ongoing benefit. In bankruptcy, the parties
are petitioning for relief; in that sense, they more closely resemble indigents
whose initial welfare applications have been rejected than recipients whose
ongoing payments have been suspended. While the Supreme Court has
reserved decision on the question of whether applicants for benefits possess a
214. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973).
215. See supra Section I.C.
216. See generally TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 67 (2000) (discussing the economic stresses
that force individuals into bankruptcy).
217. Private corporations are persons for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993).
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property interest protected by the Due Process Clause," ' every circuit to
consider the issue has answered the question in the affirmative. 9
To be sure, the doctrine on statutory entitlements has evolved substantially
since Goldberg and Roth. Until recently, the Court's approach toward protected
property could be described as laissez faire. It left the task of defining the
substantive content of the property right entirely to the legislature -so long as
the entitlement met the two aforementioned conditions, the Court would
accept the entitlement's stature as constitutionally protected property and
extend to it the protections of the Due Process Clause." ° Rather than conduct
an independent assessment of the entitlement's import to its recipient before
deeming it a protected interest,2 the Court plumbed the underlying statute in
search of discretion-constraining language. 2 This often involved a "relatively
mechanistic inquiry"2 3 : if the statute contained the mandatory "shall," or its
equivalent, the Court would credit the benefit as constitutionally protected. If
the statute contained only the permissive "may," the state's retention of
218. See Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986) (citing Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 n.8 (1985)).
219. Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3 d loS, 115 (2d Cir. 2005); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3 d 549, 557-59 (6th
Cir. 2004); Foss v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F. 3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998); Flatford
v. Chater, 93 F. 3d 1296, 1304-05 (6th Cit. 1996); Mallette v. Arlington County Employees'
Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 637-640 (4 th Cir. 1996); Ward v. Downtown Dev.
Auth., 786 F.2d 1526, 1531 (ith Cit. 1986); Daniels v. Woodbury County, 742 F.2d 1128,
1132-33 (8th Cir. 1984); Kelly v. Railroad Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3 d Cir. 1980);
Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 121-22 (9 th Cir. 1979).
22o. See Grey, supra note 185.
221. Until recently, the Court's value judgments were mostly limited to assessments of the
import of the property interest for the purpose of assigning how much process was due
before depriving an individual of it. See Resnik, supra note 210, at 498.
222. A common misconception is that the property interest must be indispensable to one's
livelihood. See, e.g., Davida H. Isaacs, Shifting Constitutional Sands: Can and Should
Patentholders Rely on the Due Process Clause To Thwart Government Action?, 35 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 627, 654 (2oo8) (arguing that only the weightiest interests qualify as property
interests). The Court, however, has repeatedly rejected that notion. See Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 576 (1975) ("The Court's view has been that as long as a property deprivation is
not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to the question whether account must be taken of the
Due Process Clause."); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88-90 (1972) (rejecting the
argument that only "absolute necessities of life" like welfare qualify as property protected by
the Due Process Clause). Courts consider the gravity of the interest not when determining
the existence of a property interest but when determining how much process is required
when a state terminates the interest. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
223. Resnik, supra note 210, at 502.
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discretion would likely disqualify the benefit from any claim to status as
constitutional property.2' 4
In two recent cases, however, the Court has abandoned this deferential
approach and asserted its authority to limit what types of discretion-limiting
statutory entitlements may qualify as property cognizable under the Due
Process Clause. The first case, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, involved a claim
brought by a woman alleging that the town police violated her due process
rights when their failure to enforce a restraining order against her estranged
husband led to the kidnapping and murder of her children. '5 The woman
asserted a property interest in the enforcement of the restraining order, which
provided that, unless impractical, the "peace officer shall arrest" an individual
in violation of the restraining order.2, 6 A seven-Justice majority rejected the
plaintiff's claim to a property interest in the enforcement of the restraining
order on three grounds. First, the majority concluded that obligatory language
("shall") notwithstanding, the coexistence of the "well established tradition of
police discretion" and mandatory enforcement statutes suggested that
Colorado law did not really make enforcement of the restraining order
mandatory. 27 Second, the majority found that even if arrest were mandatory
under Colorado law, "that would not necessarily mean that state law gave
respondent an entitlement to enforcement of the mandate," given that the
beneficiary of the restraint order scheme was not just the plaintiff, but society
at large. =8 Third, the majority found that even if the plaintiff had an
entitlement to enforcement of the restraining order, that entitlement was not a
"property" interest because it did not have "some ascertainable monetary
value."'" 9 The majority asserted that this final requirement was implicit in its
"Roth-type property-as-entitlement" cases, a claim with at least some
plausibility."'
224. Id.
22S. 545 U.S. 748, 751 (2005).
226. Id. at 759.
227. Id. at 760-64.
228. Id. at 764-65 (emphasis in original).
229. Id. at 766 (quoting Merrill, supra note 192, at 964).
230. It is certainly true that welfare, licenses, and salaried jobs have a readily ascertainable
monetary value. But the Court has recognized other benefits that cast doubt on the viability
of this requirement as a basis for excluding mandatory enforcement of restraining orders
from the rubric of "property." As the Town of Castle Rock dissent pointed out, it is unclear
how the interest in enforcing a restraining order is any less monetizable than the interest in
public education, which the Court recognized as a property interest in Goss v. Lopez. Just as
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In the second case, College Savings Bank, the Court showed an even greater
willingness to dictate which types of statutory entitlements could attain the
status of constitutionally protected property. The Court had previously stated
that the "hallmark of property. . . is an individual entitlement grounded in
state law, which cannot be removed except 'for cause."' 23' But in College Savings
Bank, the majority introduced a new and substantially more restrictive
"hallmark." The case involved an amendment to the Lanham Act232 that
stripped states of their immunity in suits for false and misleading advertising.
The parties defending the statute insisted that the abrogation was a legitimate
exercise of Congress's Section 5 enforcement powers, in this case enforcing
"two species of 'property' rights: (1) a right to be free from a business
competitor's false advertising about its own product, and (2) a more
generalized right to be secure in one's business interests." '33 The majority
determined that neither qualified as a property interest protected by the Due
Process Clause. "The hallmark of a protected property interest," it insisted, "is
the right to exclude others" and no one could claim "exclusive dominion" over
either.234 The majority never attempted to reconcile the two hallmarks, a
puzzling oversight given the Court's prior holdings that unadjudicated causes
of action- which are no more exclusionary than the interests the Lanhman Act
protected-were protected property interests .
35
Town of Castle Rock and College Savings Bank prefigure a greater willingness
on the part of the Court to conduct its own evaluation, outside the four corners
of the originating statute, of whether an entitlement is constitutionally
cognizable property. It is entirely possible that the Court will narrow further
the scope of protected property interests, but these two cases do not alter the
conclusion that bankruptcy entitlements are protected property interests.
Bankruptcy protections easily satisfy Town of Castle Rock's requirement that the
entitlement have some readily ascertainable value: the entire bankruptcy
the alternative to public education is costly private schools, the alternative to police
protection is costly private security. Id. at 791 n.19.
231. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982).
232. Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA), Pub. L. No. 102-542, 1O6 Star. 3567 (1992)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1122(b) (20o6)), amending Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60
Stat. 441 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2006)).
233- Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672 (1999).
234. Id. at 673.
23s. Logan, 455 U.S. 422; see also Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485
(1988) ("Appellant's interest is an unsecured claim, a cause of action against the estate for an
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regime is geared toward protecting and redistributing real and personal
property as well as debts with clear monetary values.
Similarly, bankruptcy protections fulfill College Saving Bank's condition
that the interests secured by the statute "bear [a] relationship to [a] right to
exclude." '236 Virtually every dispute in bankruptcy revolves around who has
exclusive rights to pieces of property.237 When the court issues an automatic
stay-a temporary injunction preventing creditor expropriation- the court is
giving the debtor an exclusive (albeit provisional) right over all property to
which the stay applies. When the automatic stay morphs into a discharge, the
debtor's exclusive interest vis- -vis pre-petition creditors becomes permanent.
Similarly, an order voiding a preferential transfer increases the size of the pool
of assets from which the creditors will make their recovery, thereby increasing
the amount of property to which creditors, at the end of the day, will have
exclusive rights.
B. "Nor shall any State deprive...
As explained above, state violations of the federal bankruptcy law are far
from rare." 8 The most clear-cut illustration of how a state violation amounts to
a deprivation of protected property is state defiance of discharge orders. The
discharge establishes a property right free and clear of all claims. If a court
granted title over a disputed sliver of land to an adverse possessor, and the true
owner tried to reclaim the property the day after, no one would quibble with
the characterization of the latter's action as lawless. No less so with state
flouting of court-ordered discharges. A state that garnishes a debtor's wages or
executes a tax lien in violation of a discharge is not only acting contrary to
federal law, it is depriving an individual of a constitutionally secured right. 39
Similarly, state violations of the automatic stay infringe on protected
property interests. One might argue that because the automatic stay, unlike the
discharge, does not conclusively resolve competing claims, a state is not
effecting a deprivation when it collects on its claims- especially since the state's
place at the top of the hierarchy scheme ensures that it will collect most of its
claims before the bankruptcy's conclusion. The problems with this argument
236. 527 U.S. at 673.
237. This is the case even where creditors are fighting to secure liens in property. See, e.g.,
Merrill, supra note 192, at 972 ("Mortgages and liens entail the right to exclude others from
impairing a security interest in resources.").
238. See supra Part I.
239, See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
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are threefold. First, even if the automatic stay does not conclusively determine
property rights, it is a universally binding injunction that accords the debtor
exclusive domain over her property in the interim. Second, much of the
property that the automatic stay secures temporarily, the discharge will secure
permanently."4 Third, it does not matter that state creditors might have claims
against the property, or that the final bankruptcy plan may require the
property's surrender to the state. As the Court made clear in Fuentes v. Shevin,
"[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's protection of 'property,' . . . has never been
interpreted to safeguard only the rights of undisputed ownership. Rather, it
has been read broadly to extend protection to 'any significant property
interest,' including statutory entitlements."4'
Of course, the beneficiary of bankruptcy protections -and, in particular,
the automatic stay- is not just the debtor. Creditors have a tremendous stake
in universal compliance with the automatic stay. Under state law, collection
efforts are first-come-first-served: the creditor that makes it to court first gets
first claim to the assets, even if that leaves the remaining creditors with
nothing. In the colorful words of Professors Ferriell and Janger: "Unrestrained,
individual creditors pay little heed to the desirability of preserving financial
value for creditors who have lagged behind in their efforts to collect. After all,
the first vulture to arrive on the scene of a fresh carcass cares little for whether
later arrivals eat their fill." 4 In the bankruptcy system, each creditor
surrenders the right to rush the assets, but in return, for patiently waiting in
line, all creditors receive a guarantee of orderly and equitable distribution of
the estate. When a state jumps the queue and reclaims its assets, it is not
merely depriving the creditor of some abstract property interest in orderly and
equitable distribution. It is directly and unlawfully diminishing the size of the
240. Partly due to these uncertainties over whether the debtor will end up retaining a particular
piece of a property at the end of her bankruptcy, it is doubtful that the Due Process Clause
would admit of distinctions between property temporarily secured by an automatic stay and
property permanently secured by a discharge. What matters is that the claimant had a
property interest at the moment of deprivation.
241. 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)) (internal
citations omitted). The issue in Fuentes was two state replevin statutes, which provided that
upon commencement of an action of replevin and the creditor's posting of a bond, the
sheriff could seize from the debtor the property securing the debt. The creditors who seized
the property asserted that the debtors' right to continued possession was in dispute and that
a hearing would reach the same result. The Court dismissed this point as "immaterial,"
remarking that "[t]o one who protests against the taking of his property without due
process of law, it is no answer to say that in his particular case due process of law would
have led to the same result because he had no adequate defense upon the merits." Id. at 87
(quoting Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915)).
242. FERRIELL&JANGER, supra note 54, at 6.
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estate against which the creditors file their claims and depleting the reservoir
from which the creditors will draw their returns.
The state's failure to return assets obtained through preferential transfer
constitutes a deprivation for the same reason. If a state keeps assets properly
belonging to the estate, every other creditor loses some of her rightful return.
There is ample precedent supporting the conclusion that this is a deprivation of
constitutional caliber. The Supreme Court's decision in Reich v. Collins is a near
perfect analogy: in that case, the Court found that a state's refusal to provide a
procedure to recover a wrongfully taxed federal entitlement (retirement
benefits) in violation of a superseding federal law (the tax code) constituted a
deprivation in violation of the Due Process Clause. 4
One might object that, in practice, preferential transfers will rarely
constitute cognizable deprivations, because the state is often unaware of the
impending bankruptcy. In such cases, the would-be debtor has violated the
provision against preferential transfers and the transaction is voidable- but the
state has not acted unlawfully by receiving a voidable transfer without its
knowledge. This state's ignorance poses two problems. First, under
O'Bannon-a case finding that lawful revocation of a nursing home's license
did not deprive that home's patients of a property interest- a lawful exercise of
power that indirectly or incidentally has an adverse impact on an individual's
property rights does not qualify as a constitutional violation. 4 4 Second, under
Daniels v. Williams, a deprivation resulting from negligence cannot furnish a
due process claim. 4 s
O'Bannon and Daniels may demonstrate that a state that receives a
preferential transfer without foreknowledge of the impending bankruptcy is
acting negligently, but not unconstitutionally. The state's ignorance might
render the initial violation of § 547 6- in other words, the acquisition itself-
an act of negligence. But once the bankruptcy court voids a transfer and
declares that the property rightfully belongs to the estate, the state is not
depriving creditors of their property interests out of mere negligence. Nor
could one characterize the economic harm it inflicts as "consequential injuries
resulting from the exercise of lawful power." 47 Rather, the deprivation is a
result of the state knowingly persisting in the retention of another's property in
243. 513 U.S. io6, 1o8-1o (1994).
244. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 788-89 (198o).
245. 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986).
246. 11 U.S.C § 547 (2oo6).
247. O'Bannon, 447 U.S. at 789 (quoting Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871)).
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violation of federal law. This sort of deprivation is readily cognizable under the
Due Process Clause.
C. ... without due process of law"
At first glance, it is not entirely clear what function the phrase "without due
process of law" has in the context of state violations of federal bankruptcy
rights. In Zinermon, the Court noted that the Due Process Clause encompasses
three types of claims: claims brought under the provisions of the Bill of Rights
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment; substantive due process
claims that challenge "arbitrary, wrongful government actions 'regardless of
the fairness of the procedures used to implement them"'; and procedural due
process claims. 4 With the first two types of claims, "the constitutional
violation.., is complete when the wrongful action is taken."' 9 Procedural due
process claims, however, are distinct: in these cases, "the deprivation by state
action of a constitutionally protected interest . . . is not in itself
unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest
without due process of law.""'0 This formulation suggests that if bankruptcy
violations sound in procedural due process, the inquiry is twofold. First, what
procedures must accompany state deprivations in bankruptcy? And second, are
the states affording those procedures? But there are also reasons to suppose
that state bankruptcy violations sound in substantive due process. Insofar as
bankruptcy entitlements owe their existence to federal law-which binds the
states through the Supremacy Clause-a state that trenches on these
entitlements acts unlawfully by definition. Affording more procedure will not
change that basic fact.
This Subsection explains why, contrary to intuition, state violations would
in fact sound in procedural due process. It then explains why the procedural
protections that must accompany these deprivations are the protections
provided by the Bankruptcy Code itself.
248. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986)).
24g. Id. (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 338 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
so. Id. (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259
(1978)).
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1. Procedural Versus Substantive Due Process
State violations of federal bankruptcy law do not fit neatly under either the
substantive or procedural due process rubric. On the one hand, the Court has
always treated deprivations of statutory entitlements as matters sounding in
procedural due process. On the other, there is a compelling argument that state
bankruptcy violations should sound in substantive due process. Procedural due
process claims do not question the underlying competency of government to
effect a deprivation, but rather, contest the adequacy of the procedures
accompanying that deprivation.'5 In the standard statutory entitlement case,
the primary function of procedure is to ensure the accuracy of the
government's legal conclusion that the claimant no longer meets the statutory
criteria for the benefit.5 ' The remedy, in turn, is not halting all deprivations,
but enhancing procedural protections to lessen the error rate-for example, by
providing pre- as opposed to post-termination hearings, court-appointed
counsel, or more robust confrontation rights.
But there is a critical difference between the standard case involving a
deprivation of a statutory entitlement and cases involving state noncompliance
in bankruptcy: the Supremacy Clause. Usually, state law generates the benefit
and specifies the conditions under which state agencies may terminate
enjoyment of the benefit. Some deprivations will be valid, some will be in
error. But where federal law generates the benefit and specifies that only a
federal bankruptcy court-not a state agency-may adjust the individual's
enjoyment of that benefit, the state is never acting within its competency by
conducting a deprivation. The error rate is one hundred percent. A state may
never lawfully collect its debts in defiance of a discharge, or violate the
automatic stay, or retain preferential transfers belonging to the estate. In that
251. Carey, 435 U.S. at 259 ("Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from
the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or
property."); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) ("[Procedural due process] raises no
impenetrable barrier to the taking of a person's possessions. But the fair process of
decision-making that it guarantees works, by itself, to protect against arbitrary deprivation
of property.").
252. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) ("[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped
by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process .... "); id. at 335 (announcing that
in determining the quantum of procedure due, a court must consider, inter alia, "the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"). Several scholars, however,
have argued that due process aims to preserve individual dignity as well. JERRY L. MASHAW,
DuE PROCESS IN THE ADMISTRATIE STATE 145-51 (1985); Robert S. Summers, Evaluating
and Improving Legal Processes -A Plea for "Process Values," 6o CORNELL L. REv. 1, 3 (1974).
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sense, the deprivation looks like a substantive due process violation: a court
hearing a claimant's challenge would order the state to halt its conduct, not
order the state to accord more process." 3
The force of this argument notwithstanding, present doctrine suggests that
the Court would, in fact, treat state bankruptcy violations as matters sounding
in procedural due process. The best evidence for this claim is the Court's
opinion in Florida Prepaid. That decision recognized that federally conferred
patent rights were protected property interests, and that a state that knowingly
infringed on those rights acted unlawfully. However, the majority concluded
that the state's unlawful conduct did not ripen into a constitutional violation
unless the state failed to provide a post-deprivation remedy.2" What is striking
about this opinion is that it takes an act of substantively arbitrary state conduct
for which there is no legal justification (patent infringements) and converts it
into a claim about whether the state is providing proper procedure (the post-
deprivation remedy). Of course, providing a tort remedy may insulate the state
from a due process challenge, but it will not render the patent violation lawful.
Put differently, the tort remedy does not "authorize" the deprivation in the way
that notice and a pre-termination hearing "authorize" the state to terminate
someone's welfare payments. Moreover, unlike the procedural safeguards in
the welfare context, the- post-deprivation tort remedy for patent violations is
not designed to assist a state agency in the accurate application of state law;
rather, its purpose is to provide compensatory relief for conduct that would
have been unlawful no matter how much predeprivation procedure
accompanied it.
253. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[S]ubstantive due
process . . . bars certain arbitrary government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Substantive due
process may be used to challenge both unlawful official conduct and rules and legislation.
See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) ("While due process
protection in the substantive sense limits what the government may do in both its
legislative ... and its executive capacities .. .criteria to identify what is fatally arbitrary
differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a governmental officer that is
at issue."). For a discussion on the theoretical and doctrinal differences between the two, see
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional
Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 315-27 (1993). See also Robert Chesney, Old Wine or New?:
The Shocks-the-Conscience Standard and the Distinction Between Legislative and Executive Action,
5O SYRACUSE L. REv. 981, 1003-17 (2000) (arguing that there are no plausible constitutional
or prudential reasons for treating legislative and executive challenges differently).
254. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643 (1999).
The Court proceeded to strike down the congressional statute abrogating state immunity,
finding that the existence of state remedies countered Congress's assertion that there was a
widespread practice of unconstitutional deprivations. Id. at 643-48.
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2. How Much Process is Due Process?
Assuming the Court would treat state deprivations of federally secured
bankruptcy protections as it did state infringements on patent rights, the
question becomes, how much process must the state provide to evade a
constitutional challenge when it deprives someone of a bankruptcy
entitlement? Is a post-deprivation tort remedy sufficient or must the state
provide something more?"'
Rather than assist the inquiry, Florida Prepaid only creates more confusion.
In holding that the availability of state tort schemes nullified a due process
challenge, the Court relied on a line of prison cases that have also been
criticized as conflating substantive and procedural due process.256 In Parratt v.
Taylor25 7 and Hudson v. Palmer,15 the Court held that where a deprivation of
liberty or property was random and unauthorized, the only required process is
a post-deprivation remedy-for example, a state tort remedy. In Parratt, the
prisoner's claim was for negligent loss of property; 5 9 in Hudson, the prisoner's
claim was intentional destruction of property. 6, In both instances, the
deprivation was concededly tortious and no batch of procedural safeguards
would make it otherwise. But in Zinermon v. Burch,261 the Court clarified that
post-deprivation remedies satisfied the states' obligations under the Due
Process Clause in Parratt and Hudson only because the nature of the unlawful
conduct made a pretermination hearing impossible: since the deprivation was
random and unauthorized, the state could not be expected to foresee it and
255. At the moment, little rides on the answer to this question because states do not appear to
offer any remedies for bankruptcy violations-pre or post-deprivation. Of course, it is
difficult to prove a negative, but if such remedies existed one would expect that the states
would have referenced them in the amicus brief filed by forty-nine states on behalf of the
state university in Katz. Brief of Ohio and 48 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (20o6) (No. 04-885). If, however,
states do begin to provide such remedies, the "how much process is due" inquiry will
become critically important.
256. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643. Several scholars have criticized these cases as conflating
substantive and procedural due process. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 253; Michael Wells &
Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REV.
201 (1984).
257. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
258. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
259. 451 U.S. at 529.
260. 468 U.S. at 520.
261. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
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offer predeprivation process.262 Where, on the other hand, the state is able to
predict the deprivation and afford predeprivation process, it must do so to
escape constitutional liability.263 Therefore, one would have expected the
Florida Prepaid majority to have inquired into the practical feasibility of
predicting state patent violations and affording predeprivation proceedings.
But the majority did no such thing, which only adds uncertainty to the
question of how much process a state must provide to prevent an unlawful
deprivation from giving rise to a constitutional challenge.
Since Florida Prepaid has muddled the inquiry quantifying the appropriate
amount of process, perhaps the best way to find guidance is by returning to the
case whose test Parratt, Hudson, and Zinermon purported to apply-Mathews v.
Eldridge.26 4 The test articulated in that case considers the weight of the private
interest at stake and the probability that additional procedure will reduce
erroneous deprivations, and balances those deprivations against the burdens
that the added procedure imposes on the state. 6, When applied to bankruptcy
protections, the test suggests that the minimum level of procedure that the
state must accord when acting against bankruptcy rights is the procedure
embodied in the Bankruptcy Code itself. In other words, if the state wishes to
collect a claim subject to a discharge or automatic stay, it must first plead its
case in front of the bankruptcy court. If the state wishes to retain a preferential
transfer, it must justify its authority to do so in an adjudicatory proceeding. In
each case, complying with this mandatory process requires that the state
submit to the binding jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court with its sovereign
immunity shield lowered.
Starting with the first of the three Mathews factors, the private interest at
stake in bankruptcy is profound. As explained in Part I, bankruptcy protections
are often the only thing that stands between a debtor and perpetual penury, a
corporation and forced liquidation, or a creditor and tremendous financial loss.
As to the second factor, forcing states to comply with the Bankruptcy Code
pari passu with private creditors is essential to preserving debtor and creditor
rights in bankruptcy. The Florida Prepaid majority's endorsement of
post-deprivation remedies is unworkable in bankruptcy for several reasons.
First, the economic damage resulting from state noncompliance in bankruptcy
is often dispersed, compounding, and irreversible. If, for example, a state
refuses to return a preferential transfer to the estate, potentially hundreds of
262. Id. at 128-30.
263. Id. at 136-38.
264. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
265. Id.
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creditors will see a diminution in their rightful return. Violations of the
automatic stay have the potential to inflict losses that are geometrically-
possibly exponentially -greater than the value of the debt that the state sought
to reclaim. Thus, to revisit the stylized publishing house example, if a state
exercised a tax lien on the printing press, the entire enterprise could fail. A state
remedy would have to accommodate not only the claims of the business
owners, but claims of employees whose jobs were terminated and creditors
whose investments evaporated. As a general rule, where a claimant is unlikely
to suffer severe irreparable injury from an improper deprivation, states can
satisfy their obligations under the Due Process Clause with a post hoc
remedy.66 But forced liquidation is not a bell that can be unrung.
State remedies fall short for a structural reason as well. For the bankruptcy
regime to work effectively, states must be treated like every other creditor. That
in turn requires that they be susceptible to suit and subject to the mandatory
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court like every other creditor. Exempting the
states from the bankruptcy process, while promising that states will
nonetheless be held accountable for their infractions at a later date and in a
later proceeding, violates this core precept of mandatory equality of treatment.
It would also represent the fragmentation of the bankruptcy system. To the
greatest extent possible, a trip to a bankruptcy court should be
one-stop-shopping for the resolution of claims on a debtor's assets. 6 z Building
a remedial scheme to enforce bankruptcy law that operates outside bankruptcy
court would create tremendous inefficiency and waste. Parties in federal
bankruptcy court would have to launch parallel suits in state courts to vindicate
state tort remedies; since both courts would be issuing orders effecting
creditors' interest in the estate, creditors would have to participate in all
proceedings to secure their claims.268 Adjudicating the related claims in
multiple fora would risk conflicting judgments and would require another
round of money-squandering and time-wasting litigation in venues with
different procedural and evidentiary rules. Meanwhile, the final disposition of
the bankruptcy would likely be put on hold as the parallel litigation unfolded,
introducing further delay into a process where time truly is money. 69
266. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978).
267. 1 NAT'L BANKR. REv. COMM'N, BANKRuPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, FINAL REPORT
898-900 (1997) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS] (discussing the need
for a single forum to maximize fairness and efficiency).
268. For a general discussion on the costs of bifurcating claims between federal and state courts,
see Jackson, supra note 11, at 57-58 & nn.231-32.
269. See Kenneth N. Klee, One Size Fits Some: Single Asset Real Estate Bankruptcy Cases, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 1285, 1299 n.68 (2002) (explaining that prompt restructuring is often
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It is simple to make the case that state remedies are a poor substitute for the
procedures embodied in the Bankruptcy Code. But Florida Prepaid raises
questions as to how readily accessible or fully compensatory a remedy must be
before it is judged adequate. In Parratt, the Court declared that "an adequate
state remedy to redress property damage inflicted by state officers"270 must
"fully compensate[] 271 the plaintiff and satisfy her right "to be made whole."27
But in Florida Prepaid, the majority suggested that an adequate remedy was
something less. In that case, the majority reiterated that a deprivation violates
due process "only where the state provides no remedy, or only inadequate
remedies, to injured [parties] ."1173 The congressional .record was peppered with
testimony about the uncertain access to relief, the rampant forum-shopping, 74
and the costs of pursuing claims in fifty states with disparate patent
remedies. 7s The majority, however, was unswayed: the fact that state remedies
"were less convenient than federal remedies, and might undermine the
uniformity of patent law," it ruled, was insufficient to establish inadequacy,
and therefore insufficient to justify invoking Section 5 to abrogate state
immunity.7 6 In response to the uniformity argument, the majority insisted:
"the need for uniformity in the construction of patent law is undoubtedly
important, but that is a factor which belongs to the Article I patent-power
calculus, rather than to any determination of whether a state plea of sovereign
immunity deprives a patentee of property without due process of law.
2 77
While this suggests that state remedies need not match the efficacy, ease, or
certainty of their federal counterpart, the costs of fighting a two-front litigation
battle cannot be dismissed as mere inconvenience, nor can they be dismissed as
"factor[s] which belong[] to the Article I patent-power calculus' '278 rather than
the due process inquiry. The whole purpose of the bankruptcy system is to
critical to staving off liquidity crises and preventing Chapter 11 bankruptcies from resulting
in liquidation).
270. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542 (1981) (quoting Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319
(7 th Cir. 1975)).
271. Id. at 544.
272. Id. at 542 (quoting Bonner, 517 F.2d at 1319).
273. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643 (1999).
274. Id. at 651 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27S. Id. at 656 n.7 (quoting Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong. (199o) (statement of
Robert Merges)).
276. Id. at 644, 644-48.
2-7. Id. at 645.
278. Id.
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temper the property-decimating effects of insolvency. The private interest that
bankruptcy processes protect is almost entirely pecuniary. Thus, it would be
nonsensical for the Court to suggest that the unnecessary expense associated
with state remedies was somehow irrelevant to the due process question. The
Mathews v. Eldridge test requires the Court to consider what kind of procedure
is necessary to vindicate the claimant's protected interests -in bankruptcy,
there is no adequate substitute for the procedure mandated by the Code.
That leaves the final Mathews factor: the burdens imposed on the state by
being forced to submit to federal bankruptcy procedure. Complying with
federal bankruptcy law is certainly costly; facing the prospect of suit for
noncompliance is costlier yet. But there are at least two reasons to doubt that
this would ever tip the balance. First, like the states, the United States is
frequently a creditor in bankruptcy; yet, Congress waived the federal
government's sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings,279 which
undermines the claim that subjecting governments to binding bankruptcy
process is unduly onerous. Second, in order to meet the dictates of the Due
Process Clause, the state remedy would have to provide recompense for losses
inflicted by state noncompliance. But, as explained above, minor violations in
bankruptcy may wreak exponentially greater damage on debtor prospects,
especially if the debtor is a corporation facing forced liquidation. If the state
were required to fully compensate individuals for the losses inflicted by state
violations, in many cases the state would bring less financial imposition on
itself by simply complying with the bankruptcy process from the beginning.
D. Abrogating State Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy Under Section 5
Shortly after the Seminole Tribe majority affirmed Congress's authority to
subject states to suit to enforce rights embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment,
the same majority of Justices began whittling away at that enforcement power.
Under City of Boerne and Florida Prepaid, before Congress invokes its Section 5
powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity, it must bound a new set of
hurdles, which include (1) making a showing that there is a pervasive practice
of state constitutional infringements; (2) that the proposed remedy is
"congruent and proportional" to the targeted violations; and (3) that less
intrusive state remedial schemes do not obviate the need for a federal remedy.
This Section will explain that notwithstanding the Court's inconsistent
treatment of these conditions, Congress could fulfill each requirement when
abrogating state immunity in bankruptcy proceedings.
279. 11 U.S.C. § io6(a) (2006).
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The first hurdle is the requirement that Congress make a legislative finding
showing a "widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights.2
8°
The requisite level of thoroughness and detail in that finding has varied
significantly. For example, in Garrett, which concerned a provision of the ADA
subjecting states to suit for disability discrimination, the record of state
misconduct was voluminous and comprehensive, but deemed inadequate by a
majority who dismissed the record as a scattering of unsubstantiated
anecdotes."' This prompted Justice Breyer to remark in his dissent that the
Court now "review[s] the congressional record as if it were an administrative
agency record.",s In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, by
contrast, two members of the Seminole Tribe majority found the evidence of
widespread deprivations sufficient despite a substantially sparser legislative
finding."s3 Hibbs upheld the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), which
authorized the recovery of money damages for state failure to comply with the
Act's provision entitling eligible employees to weeks of unpaid leave for family-
care purposes .14 The Court explained the differing results in Hibbs and Garrett
by noting that FMLA violations tended to involve gender discrimination,
which triggered a higher level of scrutiny than disability discrimination; state
violations of FMLA were more likely to offend Fourteenth Amendment rights,
and therefore, it was easier to show a pattern of constitutional violations. s
But, as the Hibbs dissent points out, the evidence of widespread violations of
family-care leave provisions was as sparse or sparser than the evidence
Congress adduced in Garrett.28 6 To add further confusion, in United States v.
Georgia, Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous Court upholding Title II of the
28o. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997).
281. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-73 (2001); see id. at 368 ("The
legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails to show that Congress did in fact
identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled.");
see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000) ("Congress never identified any
pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that
rose to the level of constitutional violation.").
282. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
283. 538 U.S. 721, 745-47 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
abandoning Garrett's stricter standard and relying on generic evidence of widespread gender
discrimination); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 528 (2004) ("Just last Term in
Hibbs, we approved the family-care leave provision of the FMLA as valid S 5 legislation
based primarily on evidence of disparate provision of parenting leave, little of which
concerned unconstitutional state conduct.").
284. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725-26.
285. Id. at 735-36.
286. Id. at 745-47 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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ADA's abrogation of state immunity in a suit brought by a prisoner alleging
disability discrimination in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights-
without mentioning any legislative finding at all.287
One way to make sense of these seemingly inconsistent cases is that the
Court has taken the "widespread pattern of constitutional deprivation"
standard, parsed its requirements (first, that the injuries be constitutionally
cognizable and second, that they be pervasive), and evaluated the two on a
sliding scale: the more apparent the constitutional injury, the less stringent the
requirement that Congress prove its pervasiveness. If the Court is in fact
hewing to that methodology, and if my analysis is correct and state defiance of
federal bankruptcy law effects a constitutionally cognizable deprivation,
Congress should face little trouble in making an adequate legislative finding.
Obviously, by eliminating the state's sovereign immunity defense, Hood and
Katz will have reduced the instances in which the state has defied federal
bankruptcy law. But during the years between Seminole Tribe and Hood and
Katz, when states were able to assert sovereign immunity defenses, there was a
wealth of evidence documenting state noncompliance.288 Thus, it should be
easy to prove that in the absence of abrogation -either by constitutional design
or statutory effect-there would be pervasive state deprivations of protected
property without due process.
The second hurdle that City of Boerne and its progeny erected is the
requirement that there be "a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. "2s9 The
congruence and proportionality requirement is much like the narrow tailoring
rule in equal protection cases, only here, the states are cast as the suspect class
and the fundamental right at stake is the states' freedom from undue federal
influence in their affairs. Even the conservatives on the Court recognize that
the Fourteenth Amendment operates in a zone in which the Tenth and
287. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006).
28s. See, e.g., Haines, supra note 5, at 468-71 (using legal database searches to document
widespread state practice of violating federal bankruptcy law). Of course, the cases Haines
cites do not treat these violations as deprivations of due process, but they do establish the
factual predicate that violations were frequent. Furthermore, the fact that the
documentation is in the form of judicial proceedings may be significant given Justice
Kennedy's apparent view that litigated disputes are prime evidence of a pattern of state
misconduct. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 382 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (claiming that Justice Kennedy's judgment that the congressional record was
inadequate "rests heavily upon his failure to find 'extensive litigation and discussion of
constitutional violations' in 'the courts of the United States'" (quoting id. at 376 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)) (emphasis in original)).
289. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
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Eleventh Amendments are inoperative, but for those lcery of federal power, the
corollary of this recognition is that the courts must stand vigilant against
congressional attempts to expand that zone. The City of Boerne Court struck
down the RFRA because Congress tried to do just that: by requiring courts to
apply strict scrutiny to policies resulting in nonpurposeful discrimination
against religious groups, and thereby expounding a presumptive right under
the Free Exercise Clause to challenge neutral laws of general applicability,
Congress was expanding the zone of constitutional rights rather than enforcing
existing ones. 90 The Court found that the law failed the congruence and
proportionality requirement because its "[s]weeping coverage ensure[d] its
intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official
actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter" or of their
constitutionality.29 The provisions of the ADA challenged in Garrett fell for
similar reasons.29
Florida Prepaid, however, poses a different challenge. In that case, the
majority concluded the Patent Remedy Act's elimination of state sovereign
immunity defenses was disproportionate to the alleged constitutional harm for
two reasons: first, because Congress had failed to demonstrate a high
frequency of violations;293 and second, because the law might subject states to
suit for negligent deprivations, which do not satisfy the deliberateness
requirement for a procedural due process violation.294 But as Justice Stevens
pointed out in dissent, this is conflating the two City of Boerne requirements.
The pervasiveness of constitutional violations is a wholly separate question
from the congruence and proportionality inquiry. The former speaks to the
frequency of misconduct; the latter speaks to the margin of constitutionally
permissible state conduct for which an individual can bring suit. An abrogation
provision may be perfectly fit to a certain species of constitutional violation -if
such violations are rare, the provision will rarely be utilized.9" Furthermore,
Justice Stevens noted, because few patent infringements are the result of pure
29o. Id. at 532-35.
291. Id.at 532.
292. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372-73; see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000)
(criticizing "the indiscriminate scope of the [ADEA's] substantive requirements").
293. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640-41
(1999).
294. Id. at 646-47.
295. Id. at 662-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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negligence, a vast majority of applications of the Act would be directed at
deliberate deprivations that do implicate due process.296
Thus Florida Prepaid turns the convergence and proportionality
requirement into a two-fold inquiry: First, is the frequency of state bankruptcy
violations high enough to justify eliminating immunity defenses? Second,
would a law that abrogated state sovereign immunity in bankruptcy court
subject states to suit for actions that were not constitutionally suspect? The first
question -how widespread is widespread enough? -is difficult to answer with
any certainty because the Court has never defined the requisite level of state
misbehavior necessary to trigger Congress's Section 5 authority. However, as
explained above, there is plenty of evidence of state defiance in bankruptcy.
The second question is easier to evaluate. The probable answer is no:
eliminating immunity defenses would not increase states' liability for
constitutionally sound acts. This is because the assertion of immunity itself is
inextricably linked to the deprivation. Every time a state asserts its immunity to
escape the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court, it disables that court from
effectively adjudicating the debtors' and creditors' property rights. If the
bankruptcy system by its very nature only functions properly when the court
has binding jurisdiction over all parties, assertions of sovereign immunity
result in a deprivation of property interests almost by definition. And if that is
true, abrogating sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings is
definitionally congruent and proportional. The abrogation does not augment
anyone's constitutional rights; nor does it do anything to impose obligations
on states, displace state laws, or prohibit official actions that were not already
prohibited by the binding force of the Bankruptcy Code itself. 297 Abrogation
merely enforces the property interests spelled out in the Code.
That leaves one potential final hurdle: showing that there are no means,
short of abrogating state immunity in bankruptcy proceedings, to enforce the
296. Id. at 654 n.5. The Florida Prepaid majority's reasoning is all the more baffling given that the
same five members have repeatedly affirmed that Congress's enactments under Section 5
may sweep up some state action that does not independently violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 539 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting Ganett, 531 U.S. at 365) ("Congress' power to enact 'appropriate'
enforcement legislation is not limited to 'mere legislative repetition' of this Court's
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence."). It is hard to reconcile this recognition that
Section s permits prophylactic measures with the majority's decision to invalidate the Patent
Remedy Act because in permitting suits against states for unconstitutional deprivations, it
may authorize suits against a vanishingly small number of deprivations that do not violate
independently due process.
297. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (explaining how federal bankruptcy law displaces
inconsistent state laws via the Supremacy Clause).
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property interests grounded in the Bankruptcy Code. The Court has never
explicitly required such a showing, but it would seem to follow from a
combination of Florida Prepaid's conclusion that there is no due process
violation where individuals can vindicate their rights through other remedial
schemes and the majority's assertion in Seminole Tribe that there were plenty of
means to vindicate federal rights short of authorizing private suits against the
state.29
8
I have already explained why state remedies cannot suffice.2 99 But the
Seminole Tribe majority offered three other enforcement mechanisms. First, the
federal government could bring suit against the state. 00 Second, the Supreme
Court could grant certiorari to review questions of federal law arising out of
state court decisions (assuming, of course, that the state had consented to suit
in its own courts).1 Third, individuals could sue for injunctive relief under Ex
parte Young.
2
None of these avenues offer adequate redress. As Professor Bartell has
observed, the first alternative -having the federal government initiate the
lawsuit-is "more theoretical than practical in bankruptcy" because most
debtors are private individuals, not arms of the federal government. 33
Furthermore, Congress would have to commit untold sums of money and
resources to the Department of Justice to enable the Executive to bring suit
against every state body that violated a bankruptcy order.
The second alternative- Supreme Court review of federal claims in state
courts-is similarly beset. When the Court held in Alden that states retain
sovereign immunity against federal causes of actions in their own courts, the
Court directly imperiled even this avenue for enforcement of bankruptcy
provisions. This alternative only functions if states waive their common law
immunity from suit in state court.30 4 It makes little sense to suppose that a
state that pled a sovereign immunity defense against suit in federal courts
298. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 n.16
(1996).
299. See supra Subsection III.C.2.
300. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14.
30l. Id.
302. For an excellent indictment of the majority's claim that, even where Congress may not
displace state sovereign immunity, the availability of other enforcement mechanisms is
sufficient to ensure the primacy of federal law, see Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign
Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1015-27 (2000).
303. Bartell, supra note 5, at 46.
304. See Richard Lieb, Eleventh Amendment Immunity of a State in Bankruptcy Cases: A New
Jurisprudential Approach, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 269, 334 (1999).
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would choose to forgo an equally potent defense just because the suit was
brought in state court. But the larger obstacle to securing state compliance by
exercising appellate jurisdiction over state cases stems from the sheer volume of
bankruptcy cases-approximately i.1 million in 2008, a majority of which
involve property interests of or claims against a state.30 Apart from the fact
that the Supreme Court could only grant certiorari to a piddling fraction of
those cases, this pathway would entail massive costs to the parties -including
both the cost of legal representation for another round of appeals and the cost
attending the delay in settling the bankruptcy proceedings while the parties
awaited the Court's final judgment.
The viability of the final alternative- seeking an Ex parte Young
injunction-has been the subject of much debate, but it too suffers from a
critical restriction. 6 An Ex parte Young suit must prove an "ongoing violation
of federal law," and the only equitable relief it authorizes is prospective.3"7 This
means that no matter how much financial damage a state's misconduct inflicts,
so long as the state brings its conduct into compliance with federal bankruptcy
law on the eve of the action's filing, the court will lack any authority to offer
relief. Where only Article I rooted rights are at stake, the Court has defended
this partial relief on the grounds that it strikes an appropriate balance between
the supremacy of federal law and the values embodied by the Eleventh
Amendment."' s But where interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause are at stake-as they are in bankruptcy-the Eleventh
Amendment ceases to operate as a constraint on the remedial relief that
Congress may authorize.3 °9
3o5. See News Release, Bankruptcy Filings Up, supra note 26.
306. For a criticism of the Ex parte Young alternative, see Karen Codry, Of State Sovereign
Immunity and Prospective Remedies: The Bankruptcy Discharge as Statutoty Ex Part Young
Relief: A Response, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 23 (2003).
307. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 n.16 (1996); see also P.R. Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145 .(993) ("[T]he [Ex parte Young]
exception is narrow: It applies only to prospective relief [and] does not permit judgments
against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past . . . ."); Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars courts from
offering retrospective monetary relief for Ex parte Young actions).
3o8. Green, 474 U.S. at 68.
3o9. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (holding that Congress may authorize
monetary damages against states for violations of constitutional rights).
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IV. USING ENTITLEMENT THEORY TO BYPASS SEMINOLE TRIBE
The theory that I advance in this Note - that federally sourced statutory
entitlements are protected property interests that Congress may safeguard via
Section 5-has applications far beyond bankruptcy. The theory has the
potential to resuscitate many of the congressional regimes frustrated by
Seminole Tribe's holding that Article I is not a grant of authority to abrogate
state immunity. But the theory's utility in this regard is also its greatest
liability. Without limits, its potential to upend Seminole Tribe makes it unlikely
that any one of the five pro-Seminole Tribe members of the Court would adopt
it. This Part of the Note will explain how a federalist entitlement theory could
threaten Seminole Tribe's legacy; it will also show how recent doctrinal
developments have diminished the theory's serviceability for other Article I
powers. In short, the Court could adopt my theory of bankruptcy rights as
protected property interests while doing minimal damage to the Seminole Tribe
regime.
In the immediate aftermath of Seminole Tribe, there was a compelling
argument that, given the prevailing law on statutory entitlements and
Congress's broad Section 5 powers, Seminole Tribe planted the seeds of its own
demise. Seminole Tribe held that Article I is not a source of authority to displace
state immunity, but the opinion also affirmed Fitzpatrick's holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment is such a source.31° Seminole Tribe was widely billed as
a major truncation of Congress's power over the states. By leaving Fitzpatrick
intact, though, Seminole only constrains Congress's abrogation authority if the
body of rights emanating from the Fourteenth Amendment is smaller than the
body of rights Congress could engender through its Article I powers. But
under a pre-Town of Castle Rock and pre-College Savings view of statutory
entitlements, the bodies of rights were virtually identical. Prior to those cases,
the existence of a constitutionally protected property interest hinged solely on
whether the entitlement was grounded in positive law and whether the statute
imposed mandatory limits on the ability of officials to act against the
entitlement holder.31 But the only limit on Congress's authority to generate
these entitlements and impose the attending obligations on the states is the
outermost bound of Article I itself. And so the analysis comes fill circle: any
31o. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
311. See supra Section IHA.
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private right that Congress could make binding on the states pursuant to its
Article I powers, it could enforce against the state under its Section 5 powers.
312
If this were the present lay of the legal landscape, Seminole Tribe could be
reduced to an empty shell. If property were defined solely by its source in
statute, and if the legislature had "'unfettered discretion' in defining 'property'
for purposes of the Due Process Clause,"3 13 Congress could overturn almost all
of the Court's post-Seminole Tribe decisions striking down statutory
abrogations by reclassifying the federally conferred rights as protected
property. It could re-enact the provision invalidated in Garrett subjecting states
to suit for violations of ADA Title I on the theory that Title I is a validly
enacted restriction on state antidisability discrimination,314 and that this
restriction provides disabled individuals a legitimate, legally anchored
expectation that the state will not subject them to such disparate treatment.
Congress could do the same with the ADEA provision invalidated by Kimel on
the theory that individuals have a federally secured interest in having their
employment unaffected by considerations of age. Even IGRA-the subject of
dispute in Seminole Tribe -could find a new lease on life on the theory that its
abrogation provision was a legitimate invocation of Congress's Section 5
powers to prevent states from arbitrarily denying Indian tribes their federally
afforded right to engage in certain gaming activities. All Congress would have
to do is reenact IGRA and pronounce it a bulwark designed to secure a
constitutionally protected property interest. If this were the law, Seminole Tribe
could be reduced to merely the latest reiteration of the clear statement rule
governing abrogations pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment."'
The legal landscape, however, has changed significantly in the last fifteen
years. While no one on the Court explicitly commented on the combined
potential of Roth-type entitlement cases and Fitzpatrick to thwart Seminole
Tribe's federalist makeover, subsequent decisions suggest that the
312. The only exception would be where the states provide an adequate remedial scheme such
that the deprivations never rise to the level of Due Process violations to begin with. See supra
Section III.C.
313. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 353 n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
314- Cf. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376 (2001) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("It must be noted, moreover, that what is in question is not whether the
Congress, acting pursuant to a power granted to it by the Constitution, can compel the
States to act. What is involved is only the question whether the States can be subjected to
liability in suits brought not by the Federal Government... but by private persons seeking
to collect moneys from the state treasury without the consent of the State.").
315. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985) (affirming that
Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity to enforce the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but only by "unequivocally express [ing] this intention").
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conservatives on the Court were cognizant of the risk. College Savings is a prime
example of how the pro-Seminole Tribe contingent has circumscribed the
definition of property to prevent such sidestepping. Scholars have puzzled over
why the majority introduced the "right to exclude" as the new hallmark of
constitutional property, especially without so much as referencing the contrary
precedent holding that nonexclusive entitlements like public education and
unadjudicated causes of action qualified for constitutional protection.316 A
likely explanation is that the majority realized that the purely positivist
conception of property could become a sort of Trojan horse, through which
Congress could insinuate traditional Article I grounded rights into the due
process acropolis. By changing the definition of protected property from any
monetizable statutory entitlement to only those interests displaying some right
to exclude, the Court drastically limited the number of statutory entitlements
that Congress could constitutionalize as protected property. Like the right to
operate a business free from false advertising, 3 7 neither the right to work clear
of age or disability-based discrimination nor the tribes' rights to good-faith
negotiations with states for gaming permits "bear[s] [a] relationship to any
right to exclude.",, 8 Thus, adopting my theory of federal statutory entitlements
need not necessarily lead to a reinstatement of the pre-Seminole Tribe status
quo.
The College Savings majority's failure to reconcile the new hallmark of
property with the old generates instability in this body of law and uncertainty
over how courts will handle nonexclusionary entitlements. Future majorities
may ultimately embrace the College Savings standard by withdrawing
constitutional recognition from entitlements like public education and
unadjudicated causes of action; or they may abandon the "right to exclude"
hallmark altogether and return to the prior definition of protected property as
statutory entitlement. The former would remake much of the Court's statutory
entitlement jurisprudence and diminish the body of so-called new property;
the latter would remake much of the Court's Fourteenth and Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence by bringing Congress's abrogation powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment into alignment with its substantive lawmaking
powers under Article I.
316. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 192, at 911-14 (finding it "embarrassing" that the Court failed to
reconcile the two approaches to protected property).
317. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999)
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It is unlikely that the Court will do either. So long as the 5-4 balance favors
proponents of Seminole Tribe, the Court probably will embrace a dual standard:
all federal statutory entitlements are protected property as far as federal
agencies are concerned and all state statutory entitlements are protected
property as far as state agencies are concerned. But where federal law generates
legal entitlements that bind the states, that entidement is only a protected
property interest as far as the states are concerned if the entitlement conveys
some right to exclude. Put differently, a state is bound by the Due Process
Clause when it administers its own entitlement schemes and the United States
is bound by the Due Process Clause when it administers its own entitlement
schemes. But the state is not bound by the Due Process Clause when it
interferes with a federally accorded entitlement unless that entitlement fulfills
the College Savings hallmark. The conservative justices might defend the dual
standard on the grounds that it strikes a balance between ensuring that
governments fairly and consistently implement their own entitlement schemes
and preserving the Eleventh Amendment from congressional encroachment.
This may seem unprincipled- why, after all, should the states have more
latitude in violating supreme federal law than state law?-but these types of
compromises are hardly foreign to Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence." 9
However future majorities reconcile the dueling hallmarks of property, two
limitations will bound Congress's ability to use the statutory entitlement
theory to abrogate state immunity. First, as a threshold matter, Congress will
have to identify a fount of authority to mint the property interests.' Wherever
Congress seeks to create a statutory entitlement that binds the states in some
way, it will have to demonstrate that it is acting within the scope of its
enumerated authority and in keeping with current principles of federalism.'
319. See, e.g., Pernhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, lo5-o6 (1984) (holding
that permitting prospective relief while prohibiting retroactive relief maintains a balance
between the Supremacy Clause and the constitutional precept of state immunity); Jackson,
supra note 11, at 9o-91 (criticizing the prospective-retroactive distinction as unprincipled);
see also Meltzer, supra note 302, at 1012 ("What is striking about [Alden, Florida Prepaid, and
College Savings Bank] is [the Court's] effort to enforce a vision of constitutional federalism
not by restricting the reach of congressional authority to regulate the states, but rather by
limiting the remedial means by which Congress may enforce regulation of the states that is
otherwise within its substantive legislative power. In ways that the Court fails to
acknowledge, its effort fails to promote any coherent conception of states' rights or state
autonomy while harming legitimate national objectives.")
320. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
321. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the Violence
Against Women Act's civil remedy in part because it was not closely enough linked to
economic activity to come within federal commerce power).
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Second, even if Congress satisfied the Court that it was acting pursuant to
its Article I authority and that the entitlement qualified as property, it would
still have to hew to the conditions laid out in City of Boerne and Florida Prepaid
before it enacted enforcement legislation. These decisions require Congress to
identify a pattern of unconstitutional deprivations, to show that the abrogation
is a congruent and proportional means to correct these deprivations, and to
demonstrate that no alternative remedy short of wholesale abrogation exists to
secure a property interest. 2 Many efforts to abrogate state immunity using the
procedural due process theory have and would run aground on these shoals. In
sum, bankruptcy may be one of only a handful of Article I powers for which
Congress could leverage entitlement theory to displace state sovereign
immunity.
CONCLUSION
In the four years since Justice Alito assumed Justice O'Connor's seat, the
Court has not found occasion to revisit its post-Seminole Tribe bankruptcy
jurisprudence. That fact should not lure practitioners or scholars into a false
sense of security over Katz's durability. As the last two decades of chaotic
uprooting of precedent attest, few areas of law are as unstable and personality-
driven as the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. The deficiencies in
the Katz majority's reasoning further enhance the likelihood that a future Court
will overrule Katz. The majority's failure to clarify the scope of its ancillary
order theory or hint at whether the states' cession of immunity extended to
retroactive monetary damages provide ample opportunity for conservatives on
the Court to limit Katz to its facts - that is, a suit against the state for an
ongoing violation of a facet of bankruptcy law that was well established at the
time of the Constitutional Convention. An effective bankruptcy regime
requires more.
Scholars and practitioners, however, need not rely on future majorities
affirming or extending Katz's judgment that Congress's bankruptcy powers are
an exception to Seminole Tribe's disavowal of Article I as a source to abrogate
state immunity. Bankruptcy protections are federally conferred property
interests of the same constitutional caliber as the welfare rights in Goldberg v.
Kelly or the state-provided utilities in Memphis Light. When a state tramples on
those statutory entitlements it does not merely contravene supreme federal law,
it contravenes debtors' and creditors' constitutional right to be secure from
deprivation of property without due process of law. Even under Seminole Tribe
322. See supra Section III.D.
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and progeny, it is well within Congress's authority to strip states of their
sovereign immunity to ensure that those constitutional deprivations do not go
unremedied.
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